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GENETIC GENEALOGY TO CATCH SERIAL KILLERS 
 
 
Teneille R. Brown, JD* 
 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I explain the rise 
of genetic genealogical testing and how it is employed by police for forensic 
genetic genealogy (FGG). I also clarify how FGG is different from a 
traditional search of the federal Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 
database. In the second part, I challenge the many concerns that scholars have 
raised in response to FGG. Specifically, I counter the arguments that it violates 
the Fourth Amendment, invades the privacy of innocent individuals, renders people 
unintentional genetic informants, improperly relies on police deception and the 
involuntary participation of suspects, and creates a de facto federal database. 
These concerns reflect misunderstandings of ordinary criminal procedure, the legal 
might of online user “agreements,” and the distinctions between clinical research 
and criminal law. In the third part, I provide a unique theory for why we seem to 
fear “genetic informants.” I conclude with a call for more nuanced policy measures 
that will better protect genetic privacy consistent with consumer expectations, while 
still permitting the use of FGG to deliver justice to victims and help convict serial 
killers and rapists. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumer genetics has exploded, driven by the second-most 
popular hobby in the United States: genealogy.1 Kits from the 
market leaders—23andMe and Ancestry—are top-sellers on Black 
Friday.2 As the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports, 
ancestry tests that have been bundled with information on genetic 
health risks are selling “like hotcakes,” and direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) genetic tests have “continued to skyrocket.”3 These kits allow 
users to submit a saliva sample through the mail, without the 
involvement of a physician, and test for about 700,000 genetic 
mutations. The results are then returned to them online.  
 
This “hobby” has been co-opted by law enforcement to solve 
cold cases. Officers can link crime-scene DNA with the DNA of one 
of the assailant’s relatives, which had been previously uploaded to a 
non-forensic, DTC genetic database. A 2018 study predicted that 
within a couple of years roughly 90% of Americans of European 
descent will be genetically identifiable in this way, even those who 
have never submitted a saliva sample nor been tested themselves.4 A 
 
1.  Scott Bowen & Muin J. Khoury, Consumer Genetic Testing Is Booming: But 
What Are the Benefits and Harms to Individuals and Populations?, CENTER FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL: GENOMICS AND PRECISION HEALTH (June 12, 2018), 
https://blogs.cdc.gov/genomics/2018/06/12/consumer-genetic-testing. 
2.  Shanna Mason, Privacy of Information and DNA Testing Kits, 27 CATH. 
U.J.L. & TECH. 161, 161 (2018) (“In 2017, AncestryDNA sold roughly 1.5 million 
kits from Black Friday through Cyber Monday, triple the amount of sales from 
2016.”). 
3.  Bowen & Khoury, supra note 1. 
4.  Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range 
Familial Searches, 362 SCIENCE 690, 690 & 691 fig.1 (2018); see also Heather 
Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy Databases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-
study.html?module=inline. 
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relative’s genetic data can act as a silent witness, or genetic 
informant, against the person who left the DNA at the crime scene. 
This “genetic informant” wordlessly guides law enforcement to a 
handful of potential suspects, by simply informing them that the 
suspect is very likely a third-cousin, nephew, or grandson of the 
person in the DTC database. Public records and newspaper 
clippings then provide the necessary details to put a name and 
location to the crime-scene DNA.  
 
At least thirty murderers and rapists have been arrested after 
detectives identified them through a combination of genetic testing 
and genealogy research tools. This general method has been dubbed 
“genetic genealogy”—the use of DNA to infer relationships between 
individuals.5 Given the hundreds of thousands of cold cases in the 
U.S., with some unknown number of case files containing DNA 
samples, experts predict that genetic genealogy will become a 
multimillion dollar forensic business.6 One method in particular, 
called “forensic genetic genealogy,” or FGG, has allowed law 
enforcement to significantly reduce the size of the suspect pool when 
no other good leads exist.7 
 
The public generally seems to support the use of genetic 
genealogy to apprehend violent criminals in cold cases, even when 
the individual contributing her DNA to a genealogical website had 
no notice her sample would be used in this way.8 However, legal 
scholars have sounded many alarms. In op-eds in the New York 
 
5.  Peter Aldous, The Golden State Killer Case Has Spawned a New Forensic 
Science Industry, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-dna-
business-parabon-bode. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Ellen Greytak et al., Privacy and Genetic Genealogy Data, 361 Sᴄɪᴇɴᴄᴇ 857 
(2018); Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE 6 (2019), www.justice.gov/olp/page/file/1204386/download; 
Heather Murphy, Genealogists Turn to Cousins’ DNA and Family Trees to Crack Five 
More Cold Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/science/dna-family-trees-cold-
cases.html (Referring to FGG as “long range familial searches,” or LRFS). 
8.  The majority of Americans polled support police searches of genetic 
websites that identify genetic relatives and disclosure of DTC genetic testing 
customer information, as well as creation of fake profiles of individuals by police 
on genealogy websites. Respondents were much more supportive of these 
activities when the purpose was to identify perpetrators of violent crimes than 
when the purpose was to identify perpetrators of nonviolent crimes. However, 
the sample was more likely than the rest of the population to have been the 
victim of a crime. See Christi Guerrini et al., Should Police Have Access to Genetic 
Genealogy Databases? Capturing the Golden State Killer and Other Criminals Using a 
Controversial New Forensic Technique, 16 PLOS BIOLOGY e2006906, *3 (2018). 
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Times9 and Slate,10 in scientific and legal scholarly articles,11 and in 
lobbying efforts with their legislatures,12 legal scholars have called 
for limitations or bans on these practices. Some propose requiring 
law enforcement to get warrants before police can access DTC 
genetic databases or immediately banning FGG and other genetic 
genealogy tools. In Maryland, legislators proposed a bill in 2019 to 
prohibit the searching of genealogical databases to find distant 
relatives of criminal suspects.13  
 
The opponents’ concerns are many, but they can generally 
be boiled down to fears that these new methods will invade the 
privacy and autonomy of presumptively innocent individuals by 
creating an involuntary and de facto forensic genetic database.14 
These concerns, I argue, are considerably overblown. Indeed, many 
aspects of FGG implicate nothing new, legally or ethically, and 
might even better protect the privacy of innocent individuals. That’s 
right. This methodology might reduce the privacy violations that are 
rampant in ordinary police investigations. So why are so many legal 
scholars fascinated by genetic genealogy yet fear a world where law 
enforcement uses FGG? What is it about this methodology that 
triggers knee-jerk calls to ban the use of “genetic informants?” 
 
We are right to be concerned about unleashing private, 
genetic information to the government or private actors. We are still 
 
9.  Elizabeth Joh, Opinion, Want to See My Genes? Get a Warrant, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html. 
10.  Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto National DNA Database, 
SLATE (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/national-dna-database-law-
enforcement-genetic-genealogy.html. 
11.  Natalie Ram et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal Investigation, 
360 SCIENCE 1078, 1079 (2018). 
12.  Natalie Ram, Incidental Informants Police Can Use Genealogy Databases to 
Help Identify Criminal Relatives-but Should They?, MD. B.J., July-Aug. 2018, at 8, 10. 
13.  H.B. 30, 440th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Md. 2019) (“For the 
purpose of prohibiting a person from performing a search of a certain DNA or 
genealogical data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in 
connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of 
the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired; and generally relating 
to DNA analysis.”). 
14.  Privacy is a multifaceted concept that can include the right to be left 
alone, to be free from surveillance, to remain anonymous, to keep your 
information confidential, or entirely private, or to ensure that what is said about 
you is true. Each of these privacy concepts is potentially implicated here, as well 
as the additional idea that your privacy can be violated in ways that exploit you 
and violate your autonomy. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 477, 505-24 (2005); Ellen W. Clayton et al., A Systematic Literature 
Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Privacy and Genetic Information in the United States, 
13 PLOS ONE e0204417, *14-18 (2018). 
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unlocking the secrets of our genomes, and yet the promised value of 
using genetic data to guide health care treatment is enormous.15 
Because there is a great deal of money to be made developing health 
care products that are tailored to individuals based on their genomic 
information (the goal of so-called “precision medicine”), many 
private and public research institutions would love to get their hands 
on large datasets of genetic information, especially when that 
information is coupled with multi-generational pedigrees, traits, and 
lifestyle choices. Analysts estimate the global market for precision 
medicine initiatives will increase from an estimated $92.4 billion in 
2017 to $194.4 billion by 2024.16 The value of the data that 
23andMe and Ancestry store is colossal. There is, therefore, a great 
risk of deliberate data breaches or weak user privacy protections.17 
 
By concentrating on law enforcement’s use of FGG, and 
failing to address the larger risks of genetic research and disclosure, 
these privacy scholars miss the mark. Law enforcement’s use of 
genetic genealogy to solve cold cases is a bogeyman. The larger 
threat to genetic privacy comes from shoddy consumer consent 
procedures used by DTC genetic companies, poor data security 
standards, and user agreements that permit rampant secondary uses 
of the users’ DNA and data. Unless police drastically expand the way 
they are conducting genetic genealogical searches, there is too much 
fear and fascination surrounding this methodology. This Article 
seeks to demystify this unfounded fear.  
 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In the first part, I 
explain the rise of genetic genealogical testing and how it is 
employed by police for FGG. I also clarify how FGG is different 
from a traditional search of the federal Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS) database.18 In the second part, I challenge the 
 
15.  Geoffrey Ginsburg & Kathryn Phillips, Precision Medicine: From Science to 
Value, 37 HEALTH AFF. 694, 694 (2018) (“The assembly of genomic, 
environmental, digital health, and patient-reported data from a variety of 
sources serves as the foundation for a powerful precision medicine platform that, 
when coupled to other national and global data and clinical networks, will lead 
to the dissemination of knowledge that will enable other health care delivery 
systems to benefit.”). 
16.  Global Personalized Medicine Market 2017-2018 & 2024: Market is Projected 
to Reach US$194.4 Billion by 2024 from an Estimated US$92.4 Billion in 2017, PR 




17.  Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protecting 
Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REV. GENETICS 409, 409 (2014). 
18.  The Combined DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is commonly referred to as CODIS and is the federal database that 
contains the short-tandem repeat satellite markers at 13 or 20 non-coding 
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many concerns that scholars have raised in response to FGG. 
Specifically, I counter the arguments that it violates the Fourth 
Amendment, invades the privacy of innocent individuals, renders 
people unintentional genetic informants, improperly relies on police 
deception and the involuntary participation of suspects, and creates 
a de facto federal database. These concerns reflect misunderstandings 
of ordinary criminal procedure, the legal might of online user 
“agreements,” and the distinctions between clinical research and 
criminal law. In the third part, I provide a unique theory for why we 
seem to fear “genetic informants.” I conclude with a call for more 
nuanced policy measures that will better protect genetic privacy 
consistent with consumer expectations, while still permitting the use 
of FGG to deliver justice to victims and help convict serial killers and 
rapists. 
II. THE EXPLOSION OF CONSUMER GENETICS 
In the last few years, the cost for genetic testing has dropped 
considerably, and the large genetic ancestry companies have also 
lowered their prices, resulting in a predictable spike in demand.19 
One market leader, Ancestry, boasts over 15 million customers while 
its primary competitor, 23andMe, has more than 10 million 
customers.20 One consumer genetics businessman remarked that 
“the inflection point [for DTC genetic test sales] started in the 
summer of 2016, and from there it’s gone into the stratosphere.”21 
Most of these sales have occurred in the United States, and roughly 
1 in 25 Americans have had their samples analyzed online, without 
involving a physician or geneticist.22 It is fair to say that the market 
for DTC genetic tests is booming. 
 
 
regions for the individuals who have been sampled. The sampled population 
consists mostly of criminal offenders, but has been expanded to include arrestees. 
States may contribute to the federally-maintained database. See 34 U.S.C. § 
40702 (2012). 
19.  Jie Yuan et al., DNA.Land is a Framework to Collect Genomes and Phenomes in 
the Era of Abundant Genetic Information, 50 NATURE GENETICS 160, 160 (2018); Tim 
Caulfield & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Perceptions, Problems, 
and Policy Responses, 63 ANN. REV. MED. 23, 23 (2012); see also Bowen & Khoury, 
supra note 1. 
20.  See About Us, 23ANDME, 
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/; Ancestry.com Surpasses 
15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRY, 
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2019/05/31/ancestry-surpasses-15-
million-dna-customers. 
21.  Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year DNA Consumer Testing Blew Up, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-
dna-testing-blew-up. 
22.  Id. 
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However, the many DTC companies are considerably 
different from one another. Some offer tests that claim to match 
romantic partners based on their genetic soulmate, others create 
personalized travel holidays, and still others purport to identify 
favorite beverages, all based entirely on your genetic results.23 Some 
even market themselves as being able to predict “how gay you are,” 
by relying on a study that itself specifically dismissed the idea that 
their results could be used on individuals.24 These kinds of tests lack 
clinical and analytic validity, and are a form of pseudoscience 
quackery.25 Somewhere in the middle are health-related tests that 
claim to screen for food allergies or common drug side effects, with 
some following laboratory and privacy best practices, and others not. 
Then on the other end of the spectrum are the reputable DTC-
companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry. These companies began 
by offering ancestry testing and have now branched out to offer 
health-related information.26 
So far, it does not seem that finding out about an elevated 
risk for some disease changes behaviors, and in some cases it 
probably should not. The health-related risk information is often of 
very weak predictive value, particularly for complex diseases like 
cancer. Results often reflect small increases in overall lifetime risk, 
and cannot be interpreted without knowing someone’s family 
history, personal risk, and environmental factors. Therefore, using 
DTC genetic tests to make health care decisions is often 
premature.27 At present, it seems that most people pursue DTC 
genetic testing because they are tantalized by the idea of having as 
much information about themselves as possible, even information 
that has little predictive value.  
A. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies are Under-Regulated and 
Provide Inadequate Consent and Privacy Protections 
 
23.  James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A 
Survey of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 
28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 36–37 (2018). 
24.  Bizarrely, the app developers claimed it would be “absurd” for anyone 
to use the app in the way it was marketed, as its small-font disclosures technically 
warned that the app was not to be used to predict same-sex attraction. See Amy 
Maxmen, ‘Gay Gene’ App Provokes Fears of a Genetic Wild West, 574 NATURE 609, 
609 (2019). 
25.  Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23. 
26.  See Megan A. Allyse et al., Direct-to-Consumer Testing 2.0: Emerging Models 
of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113, 116-117 (2018). 
27.  Jason Park et al., Question & Answer, Privacy in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing, 65 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 612, 613 (2019) (noting that “there is no solid 
evidence to support the contention that providing individuals with genetic 
information will . . . impact [their lifestyle choices].”). 
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Because the DTC genetic testing industry is under-regulated, 
the quality of the privacy protections and clinical and analytic 
validity of the DTC genetic tests vary considerably.28 This puts 
consumers at risk of data breaches with massive implications. Due 
to ineffective consent procedures at the initial stage when users 
submit a saliva sample and the failure of sites to require validation 
of user identities or to provide secure encryption, users may be 
unwittingly supplying the secrets of their genome to absolute 
strangers.29 These strangers could then sell or share the valuable 
genetic profile data for legal (or illegal) insurance under-writing or 
pharmaceutical advertising schemes.  
Importantly, there are no constitutional limitations on 
nefarious uses of data by private actors, and the federal Genetic 
Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA) provides inadequate 
protection.30 For example, GINA allows employers to use genetic 
risk information that they discover through “commercially available 
publications” such as newspapers, which might include websites like 
GEDMatch.31 Further, GINA does not apply to life or disability 
insurance, and it requires that the discriminatory behavior be 
exposed. As with many forms of discrimination, detection is 
notoriously difficult, as is proving the intent behind the employer’s 
or insurer’s behavior. It is possible to argue that someone’s insurance 
was priced the way it was or an adverse employment decision was 
made on some other pretextual, non-genetic basis. For example, in 
the context of racial discrimination, it is possible for an employer to 
successfully argue that the individual was fired due to very recent, 
and possibly fabricated, work performance issues, rather than due to 
the experience of racial bias. In the absence of data showing a 
disparate impact on a large number of employees, there is plausible 
deniability that the employer did not engage in intentionally 
unlawful employment discrimination. The same could occur with 
GINA. Finally, GINA is not written in stone; it is simply a 
Congressional statute that could be repealed. The privacy and 
security risks associated with DTC genetic testing led Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) to hold a press conference 
in 2017 to call for more regulatory oversight of DTC genetic 
 
28.  Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 23, at 40 (“DTC-GT remains largely 
unregulated in the majority of jurisdictions.”). 
29.  Caitlin Curtis et al., Protecting Trust in Medical Genetics in the New Era of 
Forensics, 21 GENETICS MED. 1483, 1483-84 (2019) (proposing that “[i]t must not 
be possible for an individual to unwittingly sign an agreement that results in loss 
of control of their genetic data.”). 
30.  See PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF 
GENETIC INFORMATION, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2019). 
31.  Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2019). 
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testing.32 Specifically, he asked the Federal Trade Commission to 
look closely at this industry and ensure that companies have fair 
privacy policies as well as adequate informed consent procedures. 
This has yet to occur. 
This is big business and big data research—ancestry testing 
is just the gateway. Essentially, these companies are enormous 
biobanks. Because DTC genetic testing companies often also have 
pedigree and personal information, their genetic databases could be 
instrumental in assessing genetic risk for complex diseases. This 
makes their data incredibly valuable to pharmaceutical companies 
and clinical researchers, and Ancestry and 23andMe have 
publicized their relationships with these types of research bodies. 
Unfortunately, the Common Rule, which provides 
protection for human subjects in research,33 and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which 
provides a bare minimum of protection for the security and privacy 
of identifiable health information,34 do not apply to research that 
occurs outside of a health care setting and that is not federally 
funded.35 Users may incorrectly expect certain health-related 
privacy regulations to apply because of the quasi-clinical nature of 
the information.36  
Even if companies were to voluntarily comply with HIPAA, 
we cannot rely on existing laws to protect us because it is impossible 
to completely anonymize genomic information.37 Every few months, 
 
32.  Schumer Reveals: Popular at Home DNA Test Kits Are Putting Consumer Privacy 
at Great Risk, as DNA Firms Could Sell Your Most Personal Info & Genetic Data to All-
Comers; Senator Pushes Feds to Investigate & Ensure Fair Privacy Standards for All DNA Kits, 






33.  45 C.F.R. § 46 (2019). 
34.  45 C.F.R. § 160 (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2019). 
35.  See Clayton et al., supra note 14, at *14 (“The U.S. Common Rule also 
permits the use of de-identified data without consent and with limited to no IRB 
oversight and endorses an expansive role for broad consent of identified data.”). 
36.  Park et al., supra note 27, at 614-15 (discussing the risks of cyber-attacks 
to DTC genetic testing databases, such as those waged on the 100000 Genomes 
Project data in the United Kingdom).  
37.  This will be discussed in more detail below. Nora von Thenen et al., 
Re-Identification of Individuals in Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons Via Allele Inference, 35 
BIOINFORMATICS 365, 365 (2019). See also Bridget F.B. Algee-Hewitt et al., 
Individual Identifiability Predicts Population Identifiability in Forensic Microsatellite Markers, 
26 CURRENT BIOLOGY 935, 937 (2016) (finding that forensic markers have 
nontrivial ancestry information); Michael D. Edge et al., Linkage Disequilibrium 
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new methods are developed to use genetic datasets and public 
records to re-identify anonymized samples. Given the enormous 
potential of genetic information to reveal health risks in the future, 
we need to restrict access to this information in ways that might at 
first seem paternalistic. More will be said below about how we might 
improve the consent procedures and limit secondary uses, but we 
should also reconsider whether health-related information should 
ever be relayed without a physician’s or genetic counselor’s 
interpretation.  
B. DTC Genetic Tests That Rely on SNP Data Reveal More Than Just 
Ancestry 
The genetics revolution, fueled in part by an explosion in 
DTC genetic testing, is upon us. In 2017 alone, about 7 million 
genetic testing kits were sold directly to individuals, and 20 million 
kits were expected to be sold in 2018.38 Driven mostly by 
genealogical hobbyists, the majority of the DTC ancestry genetic 
testing services rely on single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), 
which are mutations at the level of the individual nucleotides. While 
SNP data is not nearly as rich as data gathered from sequencing, it 
still provides a significant amount of information about future risk of 
disease.  
 
SNP data can also reveal whether users share segments of their 
genome with other users, predicting relatedness through a common 
ancestor. This works by analyzing the percentage of overlapping bits 
of genetic code, so-called “identical by descent” sections, that one 
shares with relatives. Assuming no historical inbreeding, one likely 
shares roughly 12% of their genome with first cousins, about 3% 
with second cousins, and less than 1% with third cousins.39 Thus, 
by finding and quantifying overlapping genetic regions, DTC 
companies can predict genetic familial relationships. However, 
because parents do not contribute exactly half of their genome to 
their offspring and the reshuffling of DNA can be random, third 
cousins may share more DNA fragments than second cousins.40 
Since genetic inheritance varies from child to child, as one moves 
 
Matches Forensic Genetic Records to Disjoint Genomic Marker Sets, 114 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 5671, 5671-76 (2017) (finding that genetic databases can be 
compared to identify individuals). 
38.  Erlich et al., supra note 4 at 690; Park et al., supra note 27, at 612. 
39.  Average Percent DNA Shared Between Relatives, 23ANDME, 
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212170668-Average-
percent-DNA-shared-between-relatives (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
40.  Catherine Rehder et al., American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics: 
Standards and Guidelines for Documenting Suspected Consanguinity as an Incidental Finding 
of Genomic Testing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 150, 151 (2013). 
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beyond the level of third cousins, there is a decent chance that a 
known genealogical relationship will not be detectable genetically.41  
In addition to predicting genealogical relationships, some 
DTC genetic tests now reveal SNPs linked to developing diseases 
and other traits.42 While most complex traits cannot be reliably and 
accurately predicted through SNP data, there are thousands of 
individual mutations or “genotypes” that can increase the likelihood 
of developing a particular trait or “phenotype.” Some companies 
require a physician to order these test kits, but the most popular ones 
do not.43 Other niche tests focus on so-called “recreational” traits 
like detecting the smell of asparagus in urine or identifying 
nutritional needs and possible food allergies.  
 
The leading consumer genetics companies, 23andMe and 
Ancestry, allow consumers to download their raw genetic data in 
plain-text format, which can then be uploaded to third-party 
websites.44 These websites provide a range of additional services, 
including interpreting the clinical relevance of mutations and 
allowing individuals to expand the reach of their genealogical 
search. Up to 62% of DTC customers will upload their genetic data 
to third-party websites for free or for a small fee.45	One such third-
party website is GEDMatch, an open-access service that is free for 
the most basic searches.46 
C. Third-Party Sites Like GEDMatch Facilitate FGG 
GEDMatch users can connect with even more distant 
relatives who used different testing services like FamilyTreeDNA or 
My Heritage. They do so by uploading their SNP profile, generated 
elsewhere, onto GEDMatch. The raw SNP data is analyzed using a 
simple algorithm, and the site then produces a list of likely relatives 
 
41.  Michael Edge & Graham Coop, How Lucky Was the Genetic Investigation in 
the Golden State Killer Case?, BIORXIV 5 (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2019/01/29/531384.full.pdf. 
42.  In 2013, the FDA sent cease and desist letters to 23andMe, ordering 
them to stop marketing and selling their health-related testing services until they 
received FDA approval for these devices. In 2017, the FDA approved 
23andMe’s carrier screening for hereditary Bloom syndrome, which created 
“DTC Testing 2.0.” There was now precedent and a pathway for including 
disease-risk in the DTC panels. See Megan A. Allyse et al., Direct-to-Consumer 
Testing 2.0: Emerging Models of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC 
PROC. 113, 116-117 (2018). 
43.  Eline M. Bunnik et al., Informed Consent in Direct-to-Consumer Personal 
Genome Testing: The Outline of a Model Between Specific and Generic Consent, 28 
BIOETHICS 343, 343-44 (2014). 
44.  Erlich et al., supra note 4, at 690. 
45.  See Maxmen, supra note 24, at 610. 
46.  GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated May 18, 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
2020] WHY WE FEAR GENETIC INFORMANTS 13 
automatically, without the need to share any underlying genetic 
information with the putative relative. In just a few years, 
GEDMatch has cultivated a large community of hundreds of 
thousands of users.47 While the user agreements of 23andMe and 
Ancestry state that they will not disclose users’ genetic data without 
a legal subpoena or warrant and that users must not submit samples 
under false identities,48 GEDMatch’s agreement has never included 
such guarantees. In fact, GEDMatch allows users to use an alias 
rather than their real names to register.49 In 2018, GEDMatch made 
explicit in their user agreement that law enforcement could submit 
profiles from crime scene DNA to find a suspect’s distant relatives.50 
Even before then, however, the GEDMatch user agreement 
included the following warning: “DNA and Genealogical research, 
by its very nature, requires the sharing of information. Because of 
that, users participating in this site should expect that their 
information will be shared with other users.”51 
 
In February 2019, FamilyTreeDNA announced that they 
too would allow law enforcement to submit crime scene DNA. 
Unlike GEDMatch, however, FamilyTreeDNA requires law 
enforcement to register all forensic samples and genetic files prior to 
uploading to the FamilyTreeDNA database. This is consistent with 
an interim policy issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
September 2019, which now requires law enforcement to submit the 
crime-scene derived profile explicitly on behalf of law enforcement, 
and not under false pretenses.52 Permission to use 
FamilyTreeDNA’s site for searching is only granted after the 
required documentation is submitted, reviewed, and approved. 
Permissible searches are limited to those identifying the remains of 
 
47.  Yuan et al., supra note 19, at 160. 
48.  See 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, 
www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) and 
Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRY, 
www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
49.  “Although you may provide a real name for registration and data 
upload, you have the option of providing an alias for either login or data.” Terms 
of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last 
updated May 18, 2019).  
50.  Id. (“When you upload Raw Data to GEDmatch, you agree that the 
Raw Data is one of the following: Your DNA… DNA obtained and authorized 
by law enforcement to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against 
another individual… [or (2)] identify remains of a deceased individual.”). 
51.  Cyrus Farivar, GEDmatch, a Tiny DNA Analysis Firm, Was Key for Golden 
State Killer Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2018/04/gedmatch-a-tiny-dna-analysis-firm-was-key-for-golden-state-
killer-case. 
52.  Interim Policy: Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching, supra 
note 7. 
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a deceased individual or a suspect in a homicide, sexual assault, or 
trafficking case.53  
 
In part because of these lax standards, law enforcement 
agencies have been uploading genetic profiles increasingly quickly 
to GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA to link unidentified criminals 
with relatives. Profiles are constructed from samples of blood, 
semen, or tissue found at the crime scene. Often there is insufficient 
DNA available from the crime scene to develop a full SNP profile or 
run multiple genetic tests.54 However, law enforcement’s ability to 
extract whole-genome genotypes from degraded crime-scene 
samples is improving.55 Further, if there is enough cellular material, 
which is usually the case with semen from sexual assaults, law 
enforcement can use SNP microarrays.56 The microarrays generate 
dense genetic profiles indistinguishable from those developed by the 
major DTC genetic testing companies.57  
 
Because the identity of the person from whom the crime-
scene sample came is often unknown, law enforcement uses a false 
name—“John Doe,” for example—and submits it to GEDMatch. 
Then, when their “John Doe” matches someone in the database, 
they use genealogical data to determine a common ancestor who 
might be a great-great grandfather or grandmother. They then 
triangulate other data, such as birth, voting, and military records, to 
build out the pedigrees from that common ancestor, identifying all 
of the potential individuals who may be suspects. As we each have 
about 1,000 fourth cousins and 5,000 fifth cousins,58 depending on 
the degree of relation, this process can be quite time-consuming. 
The methodology is known by different names. In the forensic 
genetics research community, it is referred to as “long-range familial 
searches” (LRFS). Law enforcement sometimes refers to this as 
Forensic Genetic Genealogy (FGG). This Article uses the term FGG.  
 
The Golden State Killer, Joseph DeAngelo, was finally 
arrested using the FGG technique after eluding California police for 
 
53.  Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA, 
https://www.familytreedna.com/legal/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019). 
54.  New developments in massively parallel sequencing may be one way of 
getting more forensic data out of a limited amount of DNA in a sample. Denise 
S. Court, Forensic Genealogy: Some Serious Concerns, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: 
GENETICS 203, 203 (2018). 
55.  See Paul Ellenbogen & Arvind Narayanan, Identification of Anonymous 
DNA Using Genealogical Triangulation 5 (bioRxiv, Working Paper No. 531269, 
2019). 
56.  Court, supra note 54. 
57.  Ellenbogen & Narayanan, supra note 55.  
58.  Court, supra note 54. 
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decades. DeAngelo murdered at least 12 people and sexually 
assaulted at least 45 women. Although law enforcement had 
multiple samples of his DNA from crime scenes, his DNA did not 
match any samples contained in the federal CODIS “offender” 
DNA database.59 Until the advent of FGG, it seemed like the 
identity of the Golden State Killer might never be known, and justice 
for his many victims might never be delivered.  
 
Once DeAngelo was finally arrested, questions regarding the 
method of his identification began to surface. The police reluctantly 
acknowledged that they used FGG, following the steps described 
above.60 The profile derived from the crime scene matched someone 
in GEDMatch—a distant cousin of the perpetrator. With the help 
of genealogists, law enforcement found a common Italian ancestor 
shared by the Golden State Killer and his distant relative.61 They 
then built the family tree branch by branch to find people who were 
about the right age and sex at the time of the crimes.62 They initially 
tailed the wrong person, following him until he left some trash 
behind that contained his DNA, which they tested against the crime 
scene samples. It was not a match. They eliminated that individual 
and kept looking for other possibilities. Eventually, they identified 
Joseph DeAngelo. After analyzing DNA he also left on a piece of 
trash, they had their suspect. It was a match. The former cop, now 
in his early seventies, was finally arrested after evading law 
enforcement for decades.  
 
The Golden State Killer was one of several suspects 
identified using FGG. Parabon® Nanolabs, Inc., a private company 
that has commercialized FGG for law enforcement, reports that a 
few dozen individuals have been arrested in this way.63 Recently, 
another large forensic laboratory has entered the market.64 Two 
decades after a man attacked ten women in their homes, 
investigators used FGG to identify Roy Charles Waller as the serial 
 
59.  More will be said about the database that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) maintains, CODIS, at p. 15. CODIS relies on a very 
different type of genetic profile, based on short-tandem repeats at 20 locations in 
the human genome that are not thought to code for traits. Because they are 
thought not to be coding regions, individual variation in these STRs is quite 
high, making them useful markers for differentiating individuals.  
60.  Edge & Coop, supra note 41. 
61.  Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found 
His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 6:22 PM), 
https://wapo.st/2HCvivq. 
62.  See Guerrini, supra note 8, at *3. 
63.  Parabon’s proprietary FDS methodology is called Snapshot Genetic 
Genealogy. See Snapshot Genetic Genealogy, SNAPSHOT, https://snapshot.parabon-
nanolabs.com/genealogy (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
64.  Aldous, supra note 5. 
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rapist. Within five minutes of viewing the GEDMatch data, they 
identified a close relative of the perpetrator. Because the individual 
in the database was a close relative, the Sacramento police had a 
suspect in under two hours, and Waller was quickly arrested.65 
 
The head of Parabon’s genealogy department, CeCe Moore, 
predicts that hundreds of crimes will be solved using FGG in the 
coming years, assuming it continues to be legal.66 While the cost of 
genotyping crime-scene DNA has dropped considerably, the 
method remains quite costly due to the significant manpower 
required to sift through archives to complete family pedigree charts. 
Few GEDMatch users are close relatives of perpetrators, as was the 
case in the Waller arrest. But when no other leads are available, 
FGG may reopen a cold case. 
D. How FGG Differs from CODIS  
1. The Federal NDIS and CODIS Database Maintained by the 
FBI 
The DNA Identification Act of 1994 established the 
National DNA Index System (NDIS), which stores the DNA profiles 
contributed by federal, state, and local forensic laboratories.67 All 50 
states, the District of Columbia, the federal government, the U.S. 
Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, and Puerto Rico 
contribute samples to the database.68 The Act limits the categories 
of people whose profiles may be maintained in NDIS and details the 
quality assurance, privacy, and expungement requirements for 
participating laboratories. Once a match is identified by the CODIS 
system, the laboratories involved in the match share information to 
verify the match and identify the individual.69 The only information 
contained in the CODIS database is an identifier of the contributing 
agency, a unique specimen identification number, the laboratory 
personnel associated with the analysis, and the “DNA profile.”70  
 
65.  Heather Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold 
Case Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/science/gedmatch-genealogy-cold-
cases.html. 
66.  Antonio Regolado, “Hundreds” of Crimes Will Soon Be Solved Using DNA 
Databases, Genealogist Predicts, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018), 
www.technologyreview.com/s/612001/hundreds-of-crimes-will-soon-be-solved-
using-dna-databases-genealogist-predicts. 
67.  Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-
analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
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2. The Limited Value of CODIS STRs for Things Other Than 
Identification 
The DNA profile that CODIS employs is very different from 
the profile used to apprehend the Golden State Killer. The CODIS 
database uses short tandem repeats (STRs) to identify individuals.71 
STRs, also known as microsatellites regions of DNA, are between 
two and six nucleotides in length.72 For example, in one area, a string 
of nucleotides such as “gata” might be repeated three times in one 
person (gatagatagata), but thirteen times in another. These STRs 
were chosen because they are polymorphic, meaning that there is 
significant genomic diversity between individuals at these locations. 
This yields more accurate matches, as it is very unlikely that 
unrelated people would share the same number of repeats at these 
loci.73 Forensic laboratory technicians create a genetic profile from 
complete STRs that is thought to have a “vanishingly small,” but 
not zero, probability of being shared with another person.74 The 
STRs are in non-coding regions of the genome, so they are not 
directly involved in coding for proteins.75 However, despite their 
limited clinical usefulness, it is not accurate to label the STRs as 
“junk DNA.”76 
 
The 20 STRs are not known to contain health-related 
information, making them much less useful for clinical research than 
data from SNPs. However, ancestry information can be gleaned 
from the CODIS markers.77 Because the locations of genes are not 
random as once thought (a phenomenon called “linkage 
disequilibrium”), CODIS markers can be used to predict some 
health risks and identify genetic profiles from biobanks that match a 
record in the CODIS database.78  
 
Initially, the DNA Profile in CODIS only included STRs at 
thirteen loci, but as of January 2017, the government gathers data 
at 20 loci to achieve even higher confidence in matching.79 These 
 
71.  Daniel M. Bornman et al., Short-Read, High-Throughput Sequencing 
Technology for STR Genotyping, BIOTECHNIQUES 1, 1 (2012). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Susan Matheson, DNA Phenotyping: Snapshot of a Criminal, 166 CELL 
1061, 1061 (2016). 
75.  The thirteen junk loci, or non-coding alleles, are “stretches of DNA 
that do not presently recognize traits and are not associated with any known 
physical or medical characteristics.” Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 639 
(2010). 
76.  Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41. 
77.  See Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41. 
78.  See Algee-Hewitt et al., supra note 37; Edge & Coop, supra note 41. 
79.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 67. 
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STR alleles are typically analyzed by amplifying the sample through 
multiplexed polymerase chain reaction, followed by capillary 
electrophoresis to separate segments.80 This technique is time and 
cost-effective, but it does not allow for systematic genotyping of all 
STR loci.  
 
Because the CODIS database relies on STRs at only 20 non-
coding loci, there is not enough genetic information to provide 
matches to relatives beyond parents and siblings or to distinguish a 
fourth cousin from an unrelated person.81 However, as most 
consumer genetics tests reveal hundreds of thousands of SNPs, 
identifying more distant relatives becomes possible—third cousins 
can usually be found, and many fourth cousins can be as well.82 
Because DOJ laboratories do not analyze SNPs during their forensic 
DNA casework, if they were to use this sort of analysis, it would need 
to be completed through an outside vendor laboratory.83 
Even with SNP data, predicting an exact relationship based on 
shared DNA alone is not always possible, with the exception of 
identical-twin, parent-child, or full-sibling matches. There are 
certain relationships that produce similar patterns of shared DNA to 
each other. For example, a woman who shares 1750 centiMorgans 
(cMs) of DNA with you could be your half-sister, grandmother, 
granddaughter, or aunt. Likewise, a first cousin, grandchild, or a 
great-uncle/aunt/nephew/niece could all share roughly 950 cMs of 
DNA.84 To predict the type of relationship, other sources of data 
such as age and death records would need to be used. 
3. Familial Searching in CODIS Is of Limited Utility and 
Requires Additional Oversight 
The FBI has discouraged law enforcement from using 
CODIS to identify partial STR matches. Partial matches occur 
when no one in the CODIS database matches the crime scene DNA 
at all 20 loci, but someone in the database matches at perhaps eight 
or so, indicating they probably are a sibling or parent of the person 
whose identity law enforcement is trying to determine. So-called 
“familial searching” in CODIS has been quite controversial, in part 
because this method produces a high rate of false positives. Also, like 
FGG, it identifies individuals by their association with people in the 
offender database, and not because they themselves chose to add 
 
80.  Bornman et al., supra note 71. 
81.  Edge & Coop, supra note 37, at 2-3. 
82.  Id. 
83.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52. 
84.  The Limits of Predicting Relationships Using DNA, THE DNA GEEK (Dec. 
19, 2016), https://thednageek.com/the-limits-of-predicting-relationships-using-
dna. 
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their DNA.85 Conducting these familial searches under CODIS 
requires greater regulatory oversight, and is limited to “the most 
serious cases.”86 Because familial searches can be unreliable, many 
states, such as Colorado, have created a committee that determines 
when a familial match is suggestive enough to disclose it to local 
investigators. Some have argued that the additional layers of 
oversight for CODIS-mediated familial matches should also be 
required for FGG. Erin Murphy, a Professor of Law at New York 
University, for example, supports the separation between the local 
police and the state committee overseeing familial searches to 
“ensure that incidental findings, such as adoption or non-paternity, 
are distanced from those in close contact with the family.” 87 
However, in practice, there is often no investigative reason to 
disclose such information to relatives, and policies discouraging such 
disclosure are reasonable. 
 
Law enforcement’s use of private databases to identify 
criminals is viewed by some as an “alarming end-run”88 around 
forensic databases like CODIS, given that CODIS has many more 
technical requirements for registering samples, conducting searches, 
and returning the results to investigating agencies.89 This argument 
is misleading. In practice, law enforcement turns to DTC genetic 
databases only when CODIS does not result in a match, consistent 
with the recent interim policy on FGG issued by the DOJ. More 
importantly, FGG differs from CODIS in ways that makes it more 
permissible and less intrusive, and thus not an “end-run” at all. FGG 
might be avoiding some of the limitations on CODIS, but the 
limitations are not required outside of CODIS because of the way 
the comparison samples are obtained. The procedure does not 
require that the government obtains samples involuntarily from 
 
85.  “[F]amilial searches should be forbidden because they embody the 
very presumptions that our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long 
endeavored to counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination, propensity, 
and even biological determinism.” Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of 
DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 304 (2010); see also Natalie Ram, The 
Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 
182, 185 (2009). 
86.  Erin Murphy, Law and Policy Oversight of Familial Searches In Recreational 
Genealogy Databases, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e5, e6 (2018). 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at e7. 
89.  “Thus, although corporations and individual citizens generate the 
largest storehouses of personal data today, the government—through its 
subpoena powers, contractual agreements, and public access to online data—
can effectively bootstrap private information into its own domain without 
contending with the Constitution.” Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and 
the Constitution, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 409, 410 (2014). 
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individuals. With FGG, the government merely accesses a public 
genealogical database, albeit for forensic purposes. 
a. The Data from DTC Genetic Databases Do Not Overlap with 
CODIS 
The power of the FGG method lies in the sheer number of 
people who have contributed samples for DTC genetic tests. Data 
analysts project that a genetic database only needs to cover 
approximately 2% of the target population to “provide a third-
cousin match to nearly any person.”90 Therefore, using population 
models that assume no inbreeding and random sampling of 
participants, researchers “predict that with a database size of ~3 
million U.S. individuals of European descent…more than 99% of 
the people of [European] ancestry would have at least a single third-
cousin match and more than 65% are expected to have at least one 
second-cousin match.”91 As the popularity of GEDMatch rises, and 
with FamilyTreeDNA announcing that they will allow forensic 
searching of their database, achieving this 2% target is within reach. 
With a warrant or subpoena, law enforcement could search 
23andMe or Ancestry, which together already have tens of millions 
of users.92  
b. FGG Uses Dense SNP Data, Which Contain Information 
about Disease Risk, Ancestry, and Physical Traits 
Many of the panels that DTC companies employ are based 
on genome-wide association studies (GWAS) from thousands of 
unrelated individuals. Researchers look for point mutations on 
thousands of alleles and correlate them with disease risk. GWAS 
studies have transformed human genetics, with the discovery of 
thousands of mutations that are associated with increased (and in 
some cases decreased) risk of developing certain diseases. However, 
as members of the tested population likely have widely varying 
lifestyles and exposure to different environmental risks, the 
predictive effects for complex diseases are often small and in need of 
 
90.  Erlich et al., supra note 4. Others predict that with as little as 1% of the 
population genotyped with dense SNP data, accurate identification is possible in 
the “median” case. See Ellenbogen & Narayanan, supra note 55. 
91.  Erlich et al., supra note 4. 
92.  Ancestry.com’s website states that AncestryDNA was “[l]aunched in 
May 2012, [and it] has more than 10 million people in its consumer DNA 
network, making it the largest in the world.” Ancestry Company Facts, ANCESTRY, 
www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/company-facts (last visited Nov. 
18, 2019). From 23andMe’s website, it states that “23andMe has more than 
5,000,000 customers.” About Us, 23ANDME, 
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us (last visited Nov. 18, 
2019).  
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updating.93 Even so, GWAS studies have the unusual scientific 
feature of being highly reproducible.94 The ability to make disease-
risk predictions from GWAS studies makes the data from the SNP 
microarrays, specifically those used by law enforcement in FGG, 
much more rich and sensitive. 95 
c. FGG Corrects the Racial Bias Inherent in the CODIS 
Database 
There is another important way in which the genealogical 
databases differ from CODIS. The CODIS database is racially 
biased, due to its significant over-sampling of African Americans. 96 
At least 40% of CODIS is comprised of African Americans, making 
it much more likely that they, and their family members, will be 
implicated in a crime through a profile in CODIS. Familial partial 
match searches would render about 17% of the African American 
population identifiable, as compared to just 4% of the Caucasian 
population, despite much lower base rates of African Americans in 
the general population.97  
 
In contrast to CODIS, the consumer genomics databases are 
much more likely to represent individuals from Northern Europe, 
thus providing matches for the mostly Caucasian population.98 
Thus, the racial bias of the databases goes in opposite directions, 
with CODIS oversampling people of color, especially African 
Americans, and consumer genomics oversampling Caucasians from 
Northern Europe. Because the consumer genomics databases do not 
overlap significantly with samples gathered pursuant to CODIS 
regulations, they provide a rich source of leads for many more 
suspects who are not of African American descent. 
 
 
93.  The predictive ability of risk evaluation from GWAS studies “depends 
on the number and effect size of the loci associated with the probability of 
developing a given phenotype, and has to date been found to generally be 
modest for most multifactorial conditions.” Joel Krier et al., Reclassification of 
Genetic-Based Risk Predictions as GWAS Data Accumulate, 8 GENOME MED. 1, 2 
(2016). 
94.  Urko Merigorta, Replicability and Prediction: Lessons and Challenges 
from GWAS, 34 TRENDS IN GENETICS 504, 504 (2018). 
95.  Murphy, supra note 86, at e5. 
96.  Curtis, supra note 29, at 2; see also Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: 
The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
248, 258-259 (2006) (noting that African American suspects are four to five times 
more likely to be identified through CODIS searches than white Americans). 
97.  Greely et al., supra note 96, at 259. 
98.  Yuan, supra note 19, at 162-163.  
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E. FGG Does Not Require a Warrant 
 
1. FGG Is Not a Return to the Abhorrent General Warrant 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting 
unreasonable searches of people or their property.99 The Framers of 
the Constitution sought to prevent the abhorrent royal practice of 
general warrants, where the government could harass people by 
“ransack[ing] one’s personal belongings” to find evidence for a 
prosecution.100 Is FGG a return to the general warrant, as it gives 
police the power to conduct “fishing expeditions” of innocent distant 
relatives of criminals in non-forensic databases? There is obvious 
appeal to this sort of thinking. The idea of a surveillance state that 
can search innocent people to solve crimes offends our deeply-held 
notions of liberty and privacy. However, there is a very important 
distinction between the historical practice of general warrants and 
the use of FGG that shows just how unlike the general warrant FGG 
truly is.  
 
Before the government may search a person or place in a 
way that could pose an unreasonable risk to their privacy, they must 
first obtain a warrant from a judge or magistrate based upon 
probable cause.101 The officer applying for a warrant must describe 
with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things 
to be seized. Warrants thus limit the scope of searches and prevent 
boundless ransacking. Any evidence, or the fruits of that evidence, 
unconstitutionally seized from that defendant and thus obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures is inadmissible.102  
 
No search occurs unless the individual “manifested a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the searched object, and society 
is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”103 Following 
 
99.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
100.  United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1992); see also 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239 (2018) (“The American 
colonists echoed this reasoning in their ‘widespread hostility’ to the Crown's 
writs of assistance—a practice that inspired the Revolution and became ‘[t]he 
driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment.’”) (internal 
citation omitted; alterations in original). 
101.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
102.  Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969). 
103.  Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (internal quotations 
omitted). This formulation comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). (“My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
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this, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes 
to the public.”104 Relatedly, a warrant is not required in many cases 
where someone voluntarily shares their otherwise private 
information with third parties. Under the “third-party doctrine,” it 
is presumed that making a deliberate choice to share information 
waives the individual’s privacy interest in the once-private 
information.105 However, what one “seeks to preserve as private,” 
even in public, may justify constitutional protection.106  
 
2. For Fourth Amendment Purposes, Discarded DNA Has 
Regrettably Been Analogized to Trash  
 
The Supreme Court followed the principles laid out in the previous 
section in California v. Greenwood, where it stated that “society would 
not accept as reasonable [a] claim to an expectation of privacy in 
trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public.”107 This 
case proved to be very beneficial to law enforcement, particularly 
with regard to surreptitiously obtaining DNA to test against crime 
scene samples. Many state courts have analogized to Greenwood to 
permit the collection of genetic samples from discarded water 
 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’ Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of 
outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has 
been exhibited.”). The simplicity of the language belies how fraught its 
interpretation has become. Fourth Amendment scholar Orrin Kerr has argued 
that “[a]lthough the courts speak of a single ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
test, the one label masks several distinct but coexisting approaches. Four 
approaches predominate, together reflecting four different models of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007). Kerr argues that only one of the four 
descriptive models, “the probabilistic model,” is actually concerned with the 
privacy expectations of ordinary citizens. Id. Other scholars, on the other hand, 
argue that each of Kerr’s four models boil down to an evaluation of 
intrusiveness. See Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, 
Bias, and Technology, 106 CAL. L. REV. 263, 277–78 (2018); see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1603-04 (2010). 
104.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Kevin J. Schrop, Your Cooperation is Greatly 
Appreciated: The Fourth Amendment, National Security Letters, and Public-Private Data 
Sharing, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 849, 857–58 (2018). 
105.  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (2018); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). 
106.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
107.  486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). 
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bottles, gum, and sealed envelopes.108 The theory is that the DNA 
on the trash is also trash, and is knowingly shared with third parties. 
This analysis strains credulity given a) how little most people know 
about the feasibility of pulling a genetic profile from their water 
bottles or chewing gum; b) the vast amounts of private, immutable 
information contained in that DNA profile, containing secrets that 
are still being unlocked; and c) our inability to refrain from shedding 
DNA on personal items we must eventually discard (unless we create 
a public health disaster by never recycling anything or disposing of 
our trash). It is indefensible to suggest that someone loses their 
subjective expectation of privacy in their genetic material by leaving 
a soda can in the trash or in a public recycling bin. Nevertheless, 
many state courts have made precisely these claims, relying on 
analogies to trash from Greenwood.109  
 
Raynor v. Maryland provides a particularly alarming example 
of how states may treat “discarded” DNA.110 In Raynor, the 
defendant had agreed to be questioned in police custody in 
connection with a rape investigation.111 Detectives asked him to 
provide a DNA sample, and he refused. While he was sitting in the 
chair, they noticed that he kept scratching his bare arms. They 
 
108.  Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and 
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 865 (2006) (“With abandoned DNA, 
existing Fourth Amendment law appears not to apply at all. It may be that an 
individual harbors an actual expectation of privacy in his genetic information. 
The few reported cases involving abandoned DNA have followed Greenwood's 
analysis, though, and have concluded that there is no objective expectation of 
privacy in saliva—and the DNA contained within it--that is left behind on a 
coffee cup or on a smoked cigarette.”). 
109.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Ewing, the police gave the defendant—
then the suspect—a meal, soft drink, straw, and cigarettes during questioning at 
a police station. 85 N.E.2d 993,1000 (Mass. App. Court. 2006), aff'd, 873 N.E.2d 
1150 (Mem) (Mass. 2007). The police took some of the defendant’s discarded 
items to the crime lab for DNA testing, where DNA on the cigarette butt 
matched that found in the rape kit. Id. at 1001. The defendant moved to 
suppress the DNA test. Id. at 1000. The court held that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy to the cigarette butt he discarded, as he 
voluntarily abandoned it as trash. Id. at 1001. Regardless of whether the police 
conduct was a ruse, police are allowed to conduct “ruses” so long as there is not 
coercion. Here, the defendant was offered a meal, which he accepted. “Under 
the circumstances, the ruse, if it was one, was proper.” Id. New Hampshire, by 
contrast, has opted to protect individual privacy to a greater extent under its 
state constitution, rejecting the idea that individuals relinquish their expectation 
of privacy in the trash they discard for municipal collection. State v. Goss, 834 
A.2d 316, 319 (N.H. 2003) (“We conclude that the defendant exhibited an 
actual expectation of privacy in his trash because he placed it in black plastic 
bags with the expectation it would be picked up by authorized persons for 
eventual disposal. We also conclude that society is prepared to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.”). 
110.  Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014). 
111.  Id. 
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figured he might have shed some skin cells. After he left the room, 
detectives obtained his genetic material from his chair, tested it to 
develop a genetic profile, and compared the genetic profile to that 
of DNA obtained from the crime scene.112 The Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that law enforcement’s “analysis of the 13 identifying 
loci within [defendant’s] DNA left behind on the chair at the police 
station, in order to determine a match with the DNA the police 
collected from the scene of the rape, was not a search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.113 The basis for these sorts of opinions (i.e., the 
idea that one loses her subjective expectation of privacy when she 
leaves articles in the trash) has become increasingly vulnerable. The 
doctrine appears to be on thin ice.114  
3. Consumers Who Upload Genetic Profiles to Open-Access 
Genetic Websites Lose Their Subjective Expectation of Privacy  
In the recent Fourth Amendment case of Carpenter v. United 
States, the majority opinion recognized that the type and volume of 
information, as well as the manner in which it is shared with third 
parties, should be relevant to our actual subjective expectation of 
privacy.115 It may no longer be enough that the information is 
technically “shared” by placing it somewhere others can access. 
Indeed, the Carpenter majority recognized a “world of difference” 
between the limited information collected by telephone companies 
when users dial a landline telephone number and the “exhaustive 
chronicle” of cellphone-site location information that is “casually” 
shared by subscribers.116 The court noted that just as cell-site 
tracking information is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly 
compiled … generat[ing] increasingly vast amounts of increasingly 
precise [data],” the very same could be said for genetic information 
gathered through shed DNA.117 The methods for determining 
ancestry, health, and familial information from our genomes are 
becoming much more precise, cheap, and predictive. At the same 
time, the donor of the DNA sample has done nothing deliberate to 
share her DNA with law enforcement. DNA collection may be as 
casual as picking up a coffee cup that someone throws away in the 
trash and swabbing it. 
 
 
112.  Id. at 756. 
113.  Id. at 759. 
114.  See Erin Cooper, Comment, Following in the European Union's Footsteps: 
Why the United States Should Adopt Its Own “Right to Be Forgotten” Law for Crime 
Victims, 32 JOHN MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L., 2015, 185, 195–96. 
115.  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018). 
116.  Id. at 2219. 
117.  Id. at 2212, 2217. 
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Further, the Court reminded us that the “nature” of the 
information sought matters for the third-party doctrine as well.118 
Each week, scientists discover new information that is embedded in 
our genome. While predictions are imperfect given varying genetic 
penetrance (i.e., the likelihood the phenotype will develop from the 
genotype) and expression (i.e., the degree to which the phenotype, 
once it develops, is expressed), there are thousands of highly 
penetrant disease risks that we can gather from our genes.119 And we 
cannot change the genes we are born with—at least not yet. Genetic 
information is, therefore, much more sensitive and in need of 
privacy protection than are cell-site location records. Thus, if the 
Court were asked to determine whether the analysis of discarded 
DNA constitutes an unreasonable search under Carpenter, the 
outcome might be very different today than it would have been 
under Greenwood. Indeed, even the dissents in Carpenter made plain 
their disfavor for Greenwood, with Justice Gorsuch excoriating it as 
one of the many “unbelievable” results of the “unpredictable” Katz 
test.120 In rejecting the idea that people lose their subjective 
expectation of privacy when they discard trash, Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent suggests that the Greenwood majority canvassed the “habits of 
raccoons” rather than the “habits of the country.”121  
 
However, there is an essential difference between cell-site 
location tracking, searching involuntarily discarded DNA, and 
voluntary uploading of genetic information to sites like GEDMatch 
or FamilyTreeDNA. Namely, the act of sharing is much more active 
and deliberate in the latter case. In holding that law enforcement 
required a warrant before they could obtain cell-site location data 
from wireless companies, the majority in Carpenter questioned 
whether cell-site tracking information is truly voluntarily shared 
consistent with the third-party doctrine.122 For one, cellphones are 
“such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one is 
nearly obligatory in modern society.123 The Court reasoned it would 
be a huge inconvenience to ask someone to abstain from using a 
cellphone in order to protect their geographic expectations of 
privacy. This argument is even stronger when thinking about 
whether we voluntarily discard our DNA through skin cells or hair. 
We cannot opt out of possessing or shedding our DNA. It would 
 
118.  Id. at 2216. 
119.  Caroline F. Wright et al., Assessing the Pathogenicity, Penetrance, and 
Expressivity of Putative Disease-Causing Variants in a Population Setting, 104 AM. J. 
HUMAN GENETICS 275, 275 (2019). 
120.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2266 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 2220. 
123.  Id. 
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require substantial and unreasonable efforts to scrub all of our 
discarded hair, fingernails, or skin cells.124  
 
However, we can opt out of participating in genetic 
genealogical services, and we can certainly avoid exposing our 
genetic information to strangers on open-source websites. The 
people who have uploaded their SNP profiles to GEDMatch or 
FamilyTreeDNA might not fully appreciate the massive amounts of 
information they are sharing. However, they are sharing this 
information affirmatively, and voluntarily, through a website for 
genealogical hobbyists. So far, this is all that the third-party doctrine 
requires. Unlike cell-site tracking, which occurs “without any 
affirmative act on the user's part beyond powering up,”125 uploading 
a genetic profile to a website like GEDMatch requires several 
deliberate and voluntary steps. If the Court continues to pursue 
doctrine like that in Carpenter, the truly voluntary sharing of 
profiles—by providing a saliva sample, receiving genetic results, 
downloading them in plain-text format from 23andMe, registering 
one’s name or alias at a separate site, and finally uploading one’s 
data to that site—would easily distinguish cell-site tracking from 
FGG.  
 
4. FGG is Analogous to the Warrantless Searching of Publicly-
Accessible Peer-to-Peer Networks to Prosecute Child Rape 
Cases involving the prosecution of people who disseminate 
child pornography (which is a euphemism for child rape) may be 
instructive in predicting how the doctrine might apply to 
investigations that use FGG. Law enforcement commonly identifies 
violations of child pornography laws by searching for digital 
signatures (SHA-1) on files that are known to contain pornographic 
images of children.126 When perpetrators download or share these 
files on peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella or Limewire, they can 
be traced through their digital signatures. Investigators use 
something called the “Wyoming Toolkit” to scan Gnutella and 
 
124.  Thus, it does seem that the Supreme Court should evaluate the cases 
using Greenwood to analogize DNA to trash and should reconsider whether a 
warrant ought to be required before a presumptively innocent individual has 
their DNA obtained from a discarded coffee cup or door handle. 
125.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
126.  JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., 2 Search and Seizure § 51.01 (5th ed. 2019) 
LexisNexis; see also, e.g., New Technology Fights Child Porn by Tracking Its “PhotoDNA,” 
MICROSOFT NEWS (Dec. 15, 
2009), https://news.microsoft.com/2009/12/15/new-technology-fights-child-
porn-by-tracking-its-photodna. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
28 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. [Vol. XXI 
Limewire for profiles sharing illicit content.127 The Wyoming 
Toolkit is a computer program and database that automatically 
identifies and labels child pornography shared over the Internet 
through peer-to-peer file sharing networks.128  
 
Those prosecuted for owning or distributing child 
pornography have argued that the use of the Wyoming Toolkit 
without a warrant constitutes an unconstitutional search under the 
Fourth Amendment. Some have even analogized to the thermal 
image scanning at issue in Kyllo v. United States129 to argue that 
searching the reference dataset against the peer-to-peer networks 
violated reasonable expectations of privacy.130 State and federal 
courts have considered this issue and “none [have] found an 
expectation of privacy” in the files that are retrieved from one’s 
personal computer that one has uploaded to a publicly accessible, 
peer-to-peer network.131 As such, there has been no search. Even 
highly sensitive information, the possession of which is a strict 
liability crime, may be deemed “no longer private” when shared 
through a third-party website. This is the case even where the users 
would need to search for this content using specific codes like 
“PTHC” (which represents the phrase “preteen hardcore”).132  
 
It is a simple step to move from these cases to an easy defense 
of FGG. Even if the genetic information uploaded is something 
meant to be kept private due to its sensitive nature, one loses the 
expectation of privacy when uploading this data from a private 
computer to a peer-to-peer sharing site like GEDMatch.  
5. There Are No Vicarious Rights Under the Fourth Amendment 
Even if the Court were prepared to require a warrant for 
searching sites like GEDMatch, there would be other obstacles to 
vindicating any Fourth Amendment rights. The remedy for a Fourth 
Amendment violation is the exclusion, in an eventual criminal trial, 
of any evidence that was improperly obtained as a result of the 
 
127.  Jay Shapiro, Obtaining and Suppressing Identification, 1 THE PROSECUTION 
AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES § 21.03 (2019), LexisNexis. 
128.  State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 1, 345 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Utah 2015). 
129.  533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
130.  Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 25, 345 P.3d at 1231. 
131.  Id. (collecting cases). See also United States v. Hill, 750 F.3d 982, 986 
(8th Cir. 2014) (“[A] defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
files…retrieved from his personal computer where [the defendant] admittedly 
installed and used LimeWire to make his files accessible to others for file 
sharing.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
132.  United States v. Driver, No. 11-20219, 2012 WL 1605975, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. May 8, 2012). 
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unconstitutional search.133 Because this is the remedy, the right only 
inheres to criminal defendants for unconstitutional searches of their 
person or things. Thus, even co-conspirators who were “aggrieved 
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence” cannot assert a 
Fourth Amendment claim unless they either owned or had an 
expectation of privacy in what was searched.134  
 
As applied to FGG, this means that the innocent relatives 
whose genetic profiles were searched through GEDMatch would 
certainly have no “standing” to bring a Fourth Amendment 
claim.135 While the Supreme Court has referred to this as 
“standing,” that term is not quite right. This requirement is neither 
jurisdictional nor rooted in Article III of the Constitution, but rather 
“is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.”136 Essentially, because there is no remedy for the non-
defendants whose data were searched, there is no Fourth 
Amendment right that is violated.137 This also means that the 
Golden State Killer, and other defendants like him, cannot borrow 
the Fourth Amendment violations of others and assert them by 
proxy. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which “may not 
be vicariously asserted.”138 
a. FGG Is Unlikely to Provide Basis for a Relative’s Invasion of 
Privacy Claim 
 
133.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). 
134.  Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1969). 
135.  “[T]here is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, 
the defendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search 
and seizure; (b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and 
(c) were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the 
offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested 
search and seizure.” Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1973). 
136.  United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2014). 
137.  As Shima Baradaran-Baughman aptly notes, this sort of analysis is 
flawed, as courts focus on the personal rights of the criminal defendant who 
often do not have “clean hands.” Instead, courts should balance the rights not 
just of the criminal defendant ex post, but also of society ex ante, presuming that 
the search is of an innocent individual. The rights-holder “represents the rights 
of all of society, yet the information before the court often relates only to the 
individual defendant.” Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2013). However, even if courts were prepared to balance the 
privacy interests of all of society, ex ante, it does not work as well in this context. 
When a search for a match with crime-scene DNA is conducted, the DNA 
donor is still innocent until proven guilty. Nonetheless, he has a huge evidentiary 
hurdle to overcome, given that his semen or blood was found at the crime scene; 
this no doubt skews the privacy analysis to the DNA and its donor, whose hands 
are “dirty.” See Bernard Chao et al., supra note 103, at 281–82. 
138.  See Brown, 411 U.S. at 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377, 389 (1968). 
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A criminal suspect’s relative, who presumably uploaded her 
profile to GEDMatch, could theoretically try to assert a civil claim 
for invasion of privacy against law enforcement.139 It could be a 
regular tort suit, if she could overcome governmental immunity.140 
Or, it could be a federal statutory claim, if she could assert that law 
enforcement acted under the color of state law when violating her 
civil rights.141 However, if she was indeed the person who uploaded 
or “published” her own genetic profile, she would have no recourse 
for public disclosure of private facts or any other conceivable privacy 
actions.142 The plaintiff must maintain an expectation of privacy in 
the information that is disclosed or the database that is surveilled to 
prevail on any of the relevant privacy torts.143 Evidence that the 
plaintiff voluntarily submitted the once-private information to a 
publicly available database would render her privacy claims moot. 
If, however, someone else submitted her profile on her behalf and 
without her consent, there could be a privacy tort against that 
individual. While the amount of saliva required by 23andMe (about 
a teaspoon) makes it difficult to obtain a sample without the 
individual’s compliance, it is currently possible for parents to submit 
samples on behalf of their children, Other DTC companies only 
require a cheek swab.144 One genealogical message board even 
provides guidance for how to force an elderly person to submit a 
sample, by “adding a small amount of sugar to the tip of the 
tongue.”145 The criminal whose DNA was uploaded by law 
enforcement under an alias, however, would not have a cause of 
action in tort, as courts have uniformly concluded that criminals 
have no reasonable expectations of privacy in the DNA they leave 
at crime scenes.146  
 
139.  See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
140.  “In some jurisdictions, sovereign immunity prohibits an individual 
from suing the state for invasion of privacy. In other jurisdictions, sovereign 
immunity imposes no such bar because it has been waived via the state's 
applicable tort claims act.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2016–17 (2010). 
141.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019). 
142.  103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 159 (Originally published in 2008). 
143.  See Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 702–03 (Tex. App. 1993). 
144.  Providing Saliva Sample for DNA Test Kit, 23ANDME, 
https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904530-Providing-
Saliva-Sample-for-DNA-Test-Kit (last visited Nov. 18, 2019); Who Can Use the 
23andMe Kit, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-
us/articles/202904520-Who-can-use-the-23andMe-kit. 
145.  Genealogy and Family History Beta, Comment to How to Get an Elderly 
Person to Provide Saliva Sample for DNA?, STACKEXCHANGE, 
https://genealogy.stackexchange.com/questions/12177/how-to-get-an-elderly-
person-to-provide-saliva-sample-for-dna. 
146.  Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Current Controversies in the Use of DNA in Forensic 
Investigations, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 39, 61 (2018). 
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Opponents of FGG argue that the practice violates both the 
rights of the criminal defendant and the rights of the family member 
who contributed her genetic profile to GEDMatch. Understanding 
who holds the right proves to be critical for Fourth Amendment 
analysis. The distant relative has no Fourth Amendment claim if she 
is not prosecuted for a crime based on that DNA evidence. Likewise, 
the criminal defendant has no Fourth Amendment claim if the 
uploaded DNA comes from the crime scene and law enforcement 
uses it solely to identify the perpetrator. 
F. Debunking the Common Privacy Critiques of FGG 
Many critics of FGG now acknowledge that it does not 
violate current understandings of the Fourth Amendment.147 Even 
if the search through FGG passes constitutional muster, however, 
many argue that the methodology is too intrusive into the lives and 
genomes of innocent people, because it (1) improperly renders 
distant family members “unintentional informants,” (2) improperly 
encourages deceptive investigative methods by law enforcement, 
and (3) is a de facto and impermissible universal database. I will 
address each of these concerns in turn. After much consideration, I 
conclude that each concern is based on some form of genetic 
essentialism. There are many traditional non-genetics cases, which 
involve methodologies similar to FGG in important ways, that do 
not give rise to any legal claims and are in fact generally considered 
appropriate searches or disclosures. The privacy alarms that many 
critics of FGG have sounded seem to reflect a misunderstanding of 
how traditional criminal cases are investigated, when privacy rights 
are violated, and how ordinary testimony is obtained. 
 
1. Being Precise About the Actual Privacy Costs 
 
In general, many of the public responses to the apprehension 
of the Golden State Killer questioned whether the cost to privacy 
was just too high to justify the use of FGG. One ethicist recognized 
that the killer “was a horrible man and it is good that he was 
identified,” but wondered whether “the end justif[ied] the means?” 
148 Others echoed these sentiments, noting the “tendency in such 
 
147.  Ram, supra note 12 (“Current Fourth Amendment precedent, 
meanwhile, is unlikely to bar warrantless police searches of genealogical DNA 
databases.”). 
148.  Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked 
Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), 
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cases to minimize the privacy costs because the gains are so great.” 
149 In the popular press, FGG has been described as alternatively 
“creepy”150 and “dystopian.”151 The sponsor of a bill in the 
Maryland legislature to ban the use of FGG expressed his concerns 
this way: “If the state doesn’t want law enforcement searching 
databases full of its criminals, why would it allow the same kind of 
search conducted on citizens who haven’t committed any 
crimes?”152  
 
But what exactly are the privacy costs? Initially, it seems 
horribly offensive that the government could use a family member’s 
DNA to track down a distantly related criminal. But why, exactly? 
After all, when law enforcement exploited GEDMatch to apprehend 
the Golden State Killer, the database was used to do precisely what 
it was designed to do—reduce the anonymity of users and connect 
them with their distant relatives. Of course, law enforcement’s use 
of the database was probably not contemplated by its users, and 
submitting a crime scene-derived sample through an alias requires 
deceit. But GEDMatch (and now FamilyTreeDNA) users seek 
information about relatives of whom they have no knowledge. If 
these services only confirmed the names and identities of close 
relatives whose identities and personal histories were known, they 
would offer nothing of value. Importantly, law enforcement 
ostensibly only use the profile to find people who shared a common 
ancestor with the perpetrator, and do not compare any other SNP 
information. They simply use the database to connect the user with 
crime scene DNA. 
 
From the perspective of the users, they have to expect and 




149.  Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-court-rewrite-rules-dna-
searches. 
150.  Megan Molteni, The Creepy Genetics Behind the Golden State Killer Case, 
WIRED (Apr. 27, 2019), www.wired.com/story/detectives-cracked-the-golden-
state-killer-case-using-genetics. 
151.  Avi Selk, The Ingenious and 'Dystopian' DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt 






152.  Megan Molteni, Should Cops Use Family Tree Forensics? Maryland Isn’t So 
Sure, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2019), www.wired.com/story/maryland-considers-
banning-genetic-genealogy-forensics. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
2020] WHY WE FEAR GENETIC INFORMANTS 33 
unpleasant information about their relatives or their past. Indeed, 
learning that you are a distant relative of a serial killer is probably 
much less traumatic than discovering that your biological parents 
are not who you thought they were, or that you were conceived by 
rape or incest.153 These sorts of revelations seem much more likely 
to be unexpected or surprising, and yet are known to occur through 
many forms of DTC genetic testing. The possibility for learning this 
type of information does not stop DTC genetic testing in its tracks, 
so we cannot be worried about the revelation of disturbing 
information from our pedigrees. Indeed, there is no indication that 
the relatives in the Golden State Killer case were even informed that 
it was their SNP data that led to the arrest. 
 
The privacy concerns in the Golden State Killer case cannot 
simply be that a GEDMatch user discovered unpleasant information 
about a distant relative, as that is part of the service that 23andMe 
and Ancestry offer. What must be troubling, then, is the 
government’s involvement in their discovery. But the government is 
not forcing innocent people to upload their genetic profiles to the 
internet. They are merely providing those already desirous of a more 
complete family tree with an even more complete family tree—that 
is, if they even tell the user about the connection with the crime-
scene DNA. In many cases, there is no reason for law enforcement 
to reveal pedigree information with the relatives whose genetic 
profiles were used to find a common ancestor, unless they want to 
ask them questions about their relatives to narrow the pool of 
suspects. Once they have the pedigree information from a site like 
GEDMatch, they could presumably delete the fake account created 
from the crime-scene DNA.  
 
The critics of FGG shift from critiquing the government’s 
search, to critiquing the criminal’s involuntary submission of his 
DNA, to critiquing the GEDMatch user’s uploading of their DNA, 
which implicates their family members in crime. While all of these 
are valid potential privacy violations, in order to assert them, critics 
need to be a bit sloppy about what exactly the FGG technology 
entails. When we focus on precisely what is being searched and 
whose privacy interests are at stake, the privacy concerns about 
FGG largely disappear. Much of this disagreement about what to 
 
153.  Sarah Zhang, When a DNA Test Shatters Your Identity, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 17, 2018), www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/dna-test-
misattributed-paternity/562928 (“But not all biological parents want to be 
found. In conversations and correspondence with more than two dozen people 
for this story, I heard of DNA tests that unearthed affairs, secret pregnancies, 
quietly buried incidents of rape and incest, and fertility doctors using their own 
sperm to inseminate patients. These secrets otherwise would have—or even 
did—go the grave.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
34 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. [Vol. XXI 
focus on stems from confusing the pedigree with the underlying 
DNA that predicted it and from confusing a presumptively innocent 
individual with the donor of crime-scene DNA. While the donor of 
crime-scene DNA, obtained through a rape kit, is still innocent until 
proven guilty, he will often have to use a mens rea defense rather than 
being able to refute the actus reus. For this and other reasons, 
criminals have few privacy rights in crime-scene DNA, which is what 
is used to search GEDMatch. This next section aims to sharpen our 
focus of what exactly is being searched, disclosed, and violated when 
law enforcement uses FGG. 
2. Defendants Who Are Prosecuted Through FGG Did Not 
Volunteer to Have Their Samples Contributed 
The first big problem with FGG, according to opponents, is 
that those arrested following a search of GEDMatch or 
FamilyTreeDNA did not volunteer to have their DNA included in 
those databases. Further, the users of GEDMatch also did not 
“specifically and knowingly consent to the use of their genealogical 
data by law enforcement.”154 Of course, before these sites updated 
their terms of use, those uploading their data to GEDMatch did not 
give explicit consent to its particular use by police. But that is 
somewhat irrelevant. They gave blanket consent to all potential uses, 
by virtue of uploading their data to a public access site. Just as I 
consent to all uses of my videos when I upload them without 
conditions to YouTube or Facebook, I cannot later claim a privacy 
violation if someone used my public video in a way I had not 
specifically contemplated. The same is true in this context. The fact 
that users did not provide specific consent to a particular use is 
immaterial, given that they consented to all uses.  
 
One team of researchers went so far as to call law 
enforcement’s methods “unethical,” as they “bypassed the codes of 
informed consent.”155 Informed consent in the medical context 
requires that a patient understands what is being done to her before 
she agrees to be touched by a physician or researcher. Failure to 
provide informed consent could result in battery or medical 
malpractice liability. The concept of the defendant’s consent is 
under-theorized in criminal law. Detectives ought to do better to 
make sure that defendants actually consent to procedures that 
require it. But let me be clear: prosecutors will never be required to 
obtain “informed consent” before accessing a suspect’s data, nor 
should they be. 
 
 
154.  Curtis et al., supra note 29, at 1483. 
155.  Court, supra note 55. 
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The reasons for informed consent in the medical world have 
to do with the trust that patients place in their physicians, the need 
to make sure that their autonomy is respected, and the need to 
protect them from unnecessary harm.156 Informed consent also 
recognizes the inherent power and information imbalance between 
the patient and the physician.157 The concern is that the baseline 
relationship is paternalistic, since a patient might just go along with 
whatever the skilled physicians suggests. Given the trust that 
consumers place in the DTC companies and labs that process 
sensitive, health-related information, some researchers have sensibly 
argued for informed consent for DTC genetic testing.158 I discuss 
this below in Part I. 
 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, have a very different sort of 
relationship to the perpetrators of crime, which is inherently 
adversarial and not based on trust. The power and information 
imbalance swings in the opposite direction, at least at the beginning 
of an investigation where the perpetrator holds all of the cards. At 
this point, it is the prosecution that is playing catch-up. Given that it 
is crime-scene DNA that is being analyzed under FGG, and not a 
search of a presumptively innocent individual, the donor of the crime-
scene DNA sits in a very different posture than a disempowered and 
autonomy-seeking patient. There is simply no reason to afford him 
the kind of arms-length respect for autonomy that clinical informed 
consent necessitates. 
 
True, the suspect has never been arrested or convicted of a 
violent crime, which would have placed his DNA in CODIS. But 
that hardly means that “the identification of individuals who are not 
directly included in a genetic database runs afoul of any given reason 
law enforcement use of such databases is legally and ethically 
 
156.  “The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the medical 
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the 
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity. The second is that a person 
of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his 
own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. 
The third is that the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be 
an informed consent. And the fourth is that the patient, being unlearned in 
medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in his physician for the 
information upon which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising an 
obligation in the physician that transcends arms-length transactions.” Cobbs v. 
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (1972). 
157.  Janet Dolgin & Lois Shepherd, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 45–46 
(Wolters Kluwer Aspen Casebook Series, 3d. ed. 2013) (discussing the history 
and principles of informed consent to health care).  
158.  Bunnik et al., supra note 43. 
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acceptable.”159 The justifications for CODIS are different because 
they need to be different to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.160  
 
The inquiry into the propriety of FGG begins and ends with 
the consent of the initial user by their uploading data to an open-
access website. Yes, this consent implicates others, which will be 
discussed below in Part H. But there is simply no Fourth 
Amendment right of privacy in something uploaded for anyone to 
view. Outside the context of a Fourth Amendment search, the 
justifications can be, and need to be, different. That does not mean 
that the justifications for FGG are inconsistent with those for 
CODIS or that the former runs afoul of the latter. By using non-
forensic, public databases, detectives are certainly taking advantage 
of the law and dodging the warrant requirement. But justifications 
for FGG need not mirror those given for searching CODIS, just as 
the justifications for searching a peer-to-peer site for child 
pornography may be less rigorous than the justifications for 
searching someone’s private computer. With CODIS, there are 
necessary limitations because the government mandates submission of 
samples. It is entirely predictable that the calculation is different with 
FGG (requiring less justification) than with CODIS (requiring more 
justification).  
a. We Do Not Possess Privacy Rights in Our Pedigree 
Opponents of FGG seem to confuse pedigree relationships 
with the genetic regions of homozygosity that revealed them. FGG 
employs the GEDMatch algorithm to find a percentage of shared 
genetic material, which in turn predicts relationships. But there is 
nothing inherently private in our pedigree, especially when viewed 
from the perspective of someone actively seeking pedigree 
information. 
 
Even if the distant relative were told that her GEDMatch 
profile linked her to a suspected serial killer, it is hard to see how this 
revealed private information. It is potentially embarrassing and 
sensitive. But is it private, just because it was unknown? Many vital 
statistics and records are public. In the ordinary course and absent a 
closed adoption, we do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
159.  Ram, supra note 11. 
160.  See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (holding that conducting a 
DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so 
invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that 
occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and 
the search of a location). 
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in our pedigree.161 If my cousin visited the genealogical archives in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and through a search of public military, 
property, voting databases and birth records, discovered that our 
great uncle had deserted the army in the Korean War, and then 
disclosed this information on her social media account, would this 
constitute “private” information that was revealed? Under tort law, 
the answer is no. I might not have known this information, but 
legally, obscurity is not the same as privacy.  
 
If instead we focus on the disclosure that the person to whom 
we are related is a likely rapist and serial killer, this is also not private 
information. Joseph DeAngelo had three daughters and a 
granddaughter.162 Could any of them successfully argue that their 
privacy rights were violated when the Sacramento County police 
held a press conference to claim that Joseph DeAngelo, their close 
relative, was a suspected murderer and rapist? And if they could not 
claim that disclosing this fact violated their privacy, then how could 
an even more distant relation? If all that was “revealed” by the 
investigation was the relationship, it is hard to imagine that these 
distant cousins possess a privacy right that is greater than those even 
closer in relation to the suspect. Viewing the pedigree information 
this way, the FGG did not reveal any private information at all. 
b. While It Is Not Perfect, FGG May Actually Reduce 
Surveillance of Innocent People 
Opponents of FGG are also concerned that it will result in police 
“taking samples from various members of the family tree, even 
though they aren’t suspects.”163 Indeed, in the Golden State Killer 
case, the police took DNA surreptitiously from two suspects who 
 
161.  Of course, the legal rights that attach are very different from 
interpersonal expectations, as many families seek to keep pedigree information 
private. One might argue that those seeking to keep pedigree information 
private should have to overcome a rebuttable presumption that this information 
should not be allowed to be private. Courts could employ something like a “best 
interests” test, adopted from family law, to determine whether disclosure of 
pedigree information would result in a net harm to the child. Examples of when 
that might not be disclosed until maturity might include incidents of incest or 
rape. 
162.  Avi Selk, All We Know About Joseph DeAngelo, the Golden State Killer Suspect 





163.  Oreskes et al., False Starts in Search for Golden State Killer Reveal the Pitfalls of 
DNA Testing, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2018), www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-golden-state-killer-dna-20180504-story.html. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
38 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. [Vol. XXI 
proved to be innocent.164 False leads will certainly lead to testing 
genetic samples to exclude, rather than include, people as suspects. 
But on balance, will FGG obviously lead to more harassment of 
innocent individuals? Given the alternative methods of 
investigation, such as DNA Dragnets,165 high-pressure interviews, 
and regular surveillance, it does not seem so. The trick is for law 
enforcement to use the most reliable FGG and genealogical methods 
to home in on as few targets as possible and then quickly obtain a 
warrant to collect genetic samples from them. 
A case that opponents of FGG often cite as a cautionary tale 
involves a very different form of “familial matching” than that used 
by FGG. A filmmaker, Michael Usry, Jr., was wrongly arrested for 
the murder of an 18- year-old girl in Idaho Falls.166 Police uploaded 
crime-scene DNA to a small publicly-searchable database, YSearch, 
previously owned by Ancestry.167 Using Y-chromosome testing, the 
crime-scene DNA yielded a “partial match” with Michael Usry Jr’s 
father. Y-chromosome testing is different from the dense autosomal 
SNP profile now used by 23andMe, Ancestry, and GEDMatch. It 
produces haplotype group data that runs in a patrilineal line, 
connecting us to the ancestors of our deep, deep past. Because of 
this, connections can be quite remote, and unlike FGG, do not 
suggest a recent common ancestor. Y-chromosome matching is 
useful when there is a mixture of male-source and female-source 
DNA, and law enforcement wants to isolate the male DNA.168 
However, this method of ancestry testing is not very precise and is 
no longer used by CODIS for offender matching. This is because 
“men with matching Y-profiles are related in extended patrilineal 
clans, many of which may not be represented in a given 
database.”169 Thus, the partial match in this case was much weaker 
than would be a finding that two individuals share significant 
portions of their autosomal DNA through SNPs.  
 
164.  Id. 
165.  Manfred Kayser, Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Predicting Human Appearance 
from Crime Scene Material for Investigative Purposes, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS, 
Sept. 2015, at 33. DNA Dragnets can be carried out in communities where no 
DNA profile match is obtained through CODIS. In these cases, hundreds or 
thousands of individuals who live near the crime are asked to “volunteer” to 
provide a saliva sample for STR profiling through CODIS. Non-participation 
might invite suspicion, and thus direct investigators toward following up with 
that individual. Also, participation by the suspect’s close relatives can allow for a 
partial or distant match, especially if the suspect is a male and Y-chromosome 
STRs are used instead of autosomal STRs. 
166.  Molteni, supra note 150. 
167.  Id.  
168.  Mikkel Andersen & David Balding, How Convincing Is a Matching Y-
Chromosome Profile?, 13 PLOS GENETICS e1007028 (2017). 
169.  Id. 
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Even so, despite this weak partial match, law enforcement 
used very weak circumstantial evidence of Usry’s connection to 
Idaho, and the fact that he made a film about a grisly murder, to 
deem Usry the chief suspect. After obtaining a warrant to have 
YSearch provide the name of the partial match, police arrested and 
detained Usry for over a month.170 He was ultimately cleared 
through a direct comparison of his DNA to the crime-scene DNA.171 
This is a deeply concerning outcome. This case exposes the potential 
for misusing weak genetic matching data, in conjunction with very 
little circumstantial evidence, to detain someone for far too long. 
Usry cannot get this time back, and even though he was cleared of 
the charges, those who read about his arrest might always be 
suspicious. 
The problem here, however, is not unique to FGG. False arrests 
and false leads are inevitable in any investigation. Far from 
trampling on privacy rights, FGG and other DNA methodologies 
may actually reduce invasions of privacy and biased prosecutions by 
law enforcement. Without solid physical evidence like a DNA 
match, investigations and prosecutions are often left to the discretion 
of law enforcement, who must often rely on unreliable sources of 
information such as telephone tip-lines, eyewitness testimony, or 
psychological profiles. A DNA match through FGG also reduces the 
need for intrusive investigations of the innocent, which might 
include quasi-voluntary DNA Dragnets172 and eliminate the implicit 
or explicit racial biases that impact investigations.173 
If the prosecutor’s office is aggressive and a jury can be 
convinced, weak evidence can lead to many wrongful convictions. 
Methods such as FGG, combined with DNA Phenotyping,174 
provide a more efficient and less discretionary means of 
apprehending suspects in many murder and sexual assault cases.175 
In addition to protecting the rights of the innocent, it also means that 
 
170.  Molteni, supra note 150. 
171.  Crimesider Staff, Privacy Concerns After Public Genealogy Database Used to ID 
"Golden State Killer" Suspect, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018), 
www.cbsnews.com/news/privacy-concerns-after-public-genealogy-database-
used-to-id-golden-state-killer-suspect. 
172.  Victor Toom et al., Approaching Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of Emerging 
Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP) Technologies Comprehensively, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: 
GENETICS, May 2016, at c2 (questioning the truly voluntary nature of each 
person’s contribution of their sample for a DNA Dragnet, given the suspicion 
that may be aroused from non-submission).  
173.  Brief DNA Saves et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19, 
State of Maryland v. King, 548 U.S. 435 (2013) (No. 12-207). 
174.  See R. Williams & M. Wienroth, Social and Ethical Aspects of Forensic 
Genetics: A Critical Review, 29 FORENSIC & SCI. REV. 145, 146-147 (2017). 
175.  See Ray A. Wickenheiser, The Business Case for Using Forensic DNA 
Technology to Solve and Prevent Crime, 7 J. BIOLAW & BUS. 34, (2004), 
www.dnaresource.com/documents/BusinessCaseforDNA.pdf. 
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justice will more likely be served for the many victims of violent 
crimes.  
3. Debunking the Claim that Law Enforcement Cannot Lie 
When Investigating Cases 
Critics of FGG have questioned law enforcement’s use of 
FGG to arrest Joseph DeAngelo, claiming they deceived 
GEDMatch by submitting the Golden State Killer’s DNA under a 
false name.176 Others have gone one step further, suggesting that the 
investigators’ use of a fake identity to upload the crime-scene DNA 
profile to GEDMatch might raise questions about the legality of the 
evidence.177 Though we may not like it, law enforcement 
consistently engages in deception when investigating crimes. In 
some cases, due to the trickery of the perpetrators of crime, it might 
be necessary to use similar countermeasures to arrest them. As 
deception may even be used to encourage, if not coerce, a confession 
of a crime, it is certainly constitutional when applied to deceiving the 
rest of society.178  
 
For example, in Holland v. McGinnis,179 an officer lied about 
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, which in part 
caused the defendant to confess. The court held that this lie alone 
was insufficient to make the confession involuntary, as it did not 
“overcome Holland’s will by distorting an otherwise rational choice 
of whether to confess or remain silent.” 180 The Court went on to say 
that “[o]f the numerous varieties of police trickery … a lie that 
relates to a suspect's connection to the crime is the least likely to 
render a confession involuntary.”181  
 
176.  Court, supra note 55. 
177.  Kolata & Murphy, supra note 148. In September of 2019, the 
Department of Justice issued an interim policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogy 
(FGG), which prohibits investigations under the jurisdiction of the federal DOJ 
from submitting a crime-scene derived SNP profile under false pretenses to a 
DTC company or third-party site like GEDMatch. This may not be as 
restrictive as suspected, given that GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA explicitly 
permit law enforcement to submit profiles for forensic purposes. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 52. 
178.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). In Frazier, the Supreme 
Court held that police deception is a relevant factor in determining whether or 
not a confession is voluntary, but that it must be analyzed under the totality of 
the circumstances to see whether the deception violated due process. The Court 
concluded that “[t]he fact that the police misrepresented the statements [the 
codefendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this 
otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.” Id. 
179.  963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992). 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id.; see also People v. Rubio, 911 N.E.2d 1216, 1235 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 
2009). (“[M]isrepresentations, of course, may cause a suspect to confess, but 
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Trickery is also legal when law enforcement uses it to obtain 
DNA samples for identification purposes. In Commonwealth v. 
Ewing,182 police gave the defendant cigarettes, a meal, and a soft 
drink, with the hope of collecting and testing his discarded DNA. 
The police pulled a DNA profile from the cigarette butt that 
matched DNA from the rape kit. The defendant moved to suppress 
the evidence “because it was the product of an illegal ruse.”183 The 
Court, in finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the DNA from the cigarette butt, confirmed that “[t]he 
police have been permitted to employ a ruse [even] to gain entry 
into a [person's] home in certain situations…There was no evidence 
of coercion. Under the circumstances, the ruse, if it was one, was 
proper.”184 Many other state courts have held similar ruses, 
specifically to obtain DNA, are constitutional.185  
 
Detectives may also impersonate others to obtain DNA 
samples from suspects. For example, in State v. Athan, police officers 
pretended to be attorneys at a fake law firm.186 They sent the 
defendant a letter, asking him to join a fictitious class action 
lawsuit.187 Athan believed the request to be true and returned the 
letter. Law enforcement pulled a DNA profile from the envelope, 
which Athan presumably licked when sealing it. Athan was arrested 
for murder based on this DNA sample, and he moved to suppress all 
incriminating DNA evidence. The court held that obtaining the 
saliva sample in this case did not violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights. Law enforcement officers have also been 
permitted to lie to defendants to get them to submit a DNA sample 
to exonerate them from a fake crime.188 However, if the State’s 
manipulation or deception goes too far and is found to have 
improperly coerced the defendant, the consent to providing the 
DNA sample will be void.189 
 
causation alone does not constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions following 
interrogations would be involuntary because “it can almost always be said that 
the interrogation caused the confession.”). 
182.  67 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 540, aff'd, 449 Mass. 1035 (2007). 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185.  See Piro v. Guyer, No. CV 08-372-M-BLW, 2010 WL 985735, at *1 
(Idaho Mar. 15, 2010); State v. Christian, 723 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2006); Marino v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016); 
People v. Sterling, 869 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (2008); People v. LaGuerre, 815 
N.Y.S.2d 211 (2006). 
186.  158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007). 
187.  Id. 
188.  See Wynche v. State, 987 So.2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2008). 
189.  See State v. McCord, 833 So.2d. 828, 829 (Fla. Dist. Court. App. 
2002). 
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Detectives may also impersonate inmates or co-conspirators 
to procure confessions. In Illinois v. Perkins,190 the defendant made 
incriminating statements to an undercover officer who was posing as 
a fellow inmate in the prison. The defendant was incarcerated for a 
burglary, but the police suspected he was involved in an unrelated 
murder. The defendant moved to suppress the incriminating 
statements he made to the undercover cop. The Court held that 
coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect, and the 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent does not protect a suspect 
from boasting of criminal activity in front of people they think are 
cellmates.191  
 
Law enforcement officers are allowed to engage in deception 
and subterfuge to identify criminals for prosecution.192 Given the 
extent of this permitted conduct, it seems quite unlikely that the use 
of false names to submit samples to GEDMatch would render this 
evidence inadmissible. Even so, the recently issued DOJ guidance 
on the use FGG states that law enforcement should always identify 
themselves when submitting samples, and that they should not do so 
under an alias.193 As FamilyTreeDNA and GEDMatch now 
explicitly allow forensic use, this does not seem like a big obstacle. 
To be clear, this is not to say that police deception should be 
encouraged or that it is even ethical, and the analysis of discarded 
DNA should but does not require a warrant. Instead, this Article 
merely suggests that the critique of police deception through FGG 
will fall flat in the courtroom. The evidence will not be excluded 
because detectives submitted the DNA sample to GEDMatch under 
a false name. There is substantial case law to support the use of 
deception, even vis-à-vis criminal defendants. Here, the deception 
was toward a private entity, which was not the subject of the 
investigation. As a result, this is even more likely to pass 
constitutional muster. Because our guiding light in these analyses is 
the Constitution, ironically the privacy rights of innocent parties are 
even less protected than those of the criminal suspect.  
4. Debunking the Claim That Informants Must Be Asked First 
Before Providing Inculpatory Information 
 
190.  496 U.S. 292 (1990). 
191.  Id. at 297-98. 
192.  Confessions obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so 
long as the methods used are not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue 
statement. See C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession as Affected by Its 
Inducement Through Artifice, Deception, Trickery, or Fraud, 99 A.L.R.2D 772, 783 
(1965). 
193.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 52. 
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Several critiques of FGG contend that it is unfair to force 
individuals to unknowingly become informants against their distant 
relatives.194 An early article on the topic stated “fierce objections” to 
FGG, as privacy advocates “maintain that it turns family members 
into genetic informants without their knowledge or consent.”195 
Given the amount of deception that is permitted under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, it is not surprising that to be admissible, 
incriminating information need not be voluntarily and intentionally 
shared. Providing more examples outside the genetics context might 
help make this clearer.  
 
The DTC genetic testing users who uploaded their genetic 
information online “to facilitate self-discovery” probably had no 
idea, up until last year, that they could become “criminal informants 
vis-à-vis their own families.”196 Of course, if a DTC genetic 
company claimed not to share genetic information without a 
warrant or court order and then shared this information in violation 
of its terms of service, the user could sue for breach of contract. But 
GEDMatch and other databases were so attractive to law 
enforcement because their terms of service implicitly, and then 
explicitly, allowed this sort of use. There is a reason that detectives 
did not attempt to search 23andMe or Ancestry: their terms of 
service would not allow it, at least not without a court order or 
subpoena.  
 
However, the critique is not that GEDMatch violated its 
terms of service. Rather, the claim here seems to be that law 
enforcement should not be allowed to use deception to turn family 
members against one another, without their consent. The subtext of 
the question “did you realize you could be an unintentional 
informant against your family member?”197 suggests that 
prosecution witnesses are ordinarily asked whether they would like 
to provide incriminating testimony. 
 
 
194.  “People who submit DNA for ancestors testing are unwittingly 
becoming genetic informants on their innocent family,” Steve Mercer, the chief 
attorney for the forensic division of the Maryland Office of the Public Defender, 
told the Associated Press. “[Such users] have fewer privacy protections than 
convicted offenders whose DNA is contained in regulated databanks," he said. 
Nancy Dillon, Cops Tracked Down Golden State Killer With Genealogy Website That 
Keeps Users' Genetic Info Public, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018), 
www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/public-genealogy-website-led-golden-state-
killer-arrest-article-1.3958936.  
195.  Selk, supra note 151. 
196.  Guerrini, supra note 8. 
197.  See Matthew Feeney, “Genetic Informants" and the Hunt for the Golden State 
Killer, THE CATO INSTITUTE, CATO@LIBERTYBLOG (Apr. 30, 2018, 4:11 PM), 
www.cato.org/blog/genetic-informants-hunt-golden-state-killer. 
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Any criminal defense attorney will tell you this is not how it 
works. Instead, it goes something like this: a cop knocks on your door 
after your next-door neighbor is murdered, asks whether he can 
come in and ask you a few questions, then pulls out a notepad and 
begins probing you for details. He might ask questions like “when 
was the last time you saw your neighbors, how close were you, and 
did they fight?” In the course of answering these questions, you 
might inadvertently provide incriminating evidence against the 
victim’s husband. You mention that you saw him in the driveway 
cleaning out the trunk of his Subaru from about 5:00pm-6:00pm. 
You know this because you were watching your favorite TV show at 
the time, and this is when you popped your head out the window to 
see from where the vacuum sound was coming. Your neighbor, the 
husband, told the police he was alone at a movie theater at this time. 
The medical examiner puts his wife’s death at about 5:00pm that 
evening. Your testimony shatters the husband’s alibi. Whether or 
not your testimony will be admissible will not hinge at all on whether 
you were asked first whether you were intending to incriminate the 
suspect.  
 
Quite simply, we do not have a right to be asked first before 
we provide incriminating testimony against others. We possess rights 
against self-incrimination due to the Fifth Amendment. But a 
prosecution witness’s testimony is not rendered inadmissible just 
because she gave the testimony before realizing that it would be 
incriminating.  
5. Debunking the Claim That FGG Is a De Facto Universal 
Database 
Critics of FGG have also argued that it creates a shadow, de 
facto universal federal genetics database, populated with our private 
information that we never agreed to share. They argue that if we 
think law enforcement should be allowed to use FGG to arrest 
criminals, then we should have an open conversation about the 
propriety of a population-wide database, which some already 
recommend on privacy and fairness grounds.198 However, if a 
 
198.  Elizabeth Joh, A Consumer DNA Testing Company’s Alarming New Marketing 
Pivot, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2019, 4:26 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/familytreedna-dna-testing-solve-crimes-
law-enforcement.html; In response to law enforcement’s use of FGG, some 
criminal law and privacy advocates have suggested we instead adopt a universal 
genetic forensic database, accessible only through a warrant. For a serious 
proposal for a universal forensics genetic database, see James Hazel et al., Is it 
Time for a Universal Genetic Forensic Database?, 362 SCIENCE 898, 899-900 (2018).  
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universal, forensic database is the goal, they say, “we should arrive 
there directly, not as a de facto matter.”199  
But by asking whether we would be okay with a database like 
this, established by the federal government, opponents of FGG 
sidestep the crucial aspect of this methodology.200 These databases 
are not “established” by the government. The databases are not 
created, stored, or maintained by the government. Individuals are 
freely, voluntarily, and enthusiastically populating these non-
governmental databases. This distinction matters and needs to be 
given more weight.  
Consider when someone posts pictures of you on social media 
without your consent. Parents are the worst offenders, posting so 
many pictures of their non-consenting children that there is now a 
term for this: “sharenting.”201 One group of researchers discovered 
that of the 25,727 photographs parents posted on Facebook, 75.5% 
of those inspected contained a child between the ages of 0 and 8 
years old.202 Nearly 40% of parents posted over 100 photos of their 
child.203 The large majority of these pictures also contained 
information such as the child’s name and birthdate, which along 
with the location of their birth could be sufficient to predict their 
social security number.204 By posting information about children, 
who cannot consent, parents are creating a digital footprint that 
might have unforeseen consequences.205 Even so, it would be strange 
to claim that these pictures could not be accessed by law 
enforcement if they were to become relevant to a child welfare case.  
In addition to Facebook asserting a license in posted 
photos,206 courts have recognized that “Facebook itself does not 
guarantee privacy.”207 Courts have held that “generally, the 
photographs posted on a social networking site are neither privileged 
nor protected by any right of privacy, regardless of any privacy 
 
199.  Id.  
200.  Ram, supra note 12. 
201.  Anna Brosch, When the Child is Born Into the Internet: Sharenting as a Growing 
Trend Among Parents on Facebook, NEW EDUC. REV. 225, 229 (2016). 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from 
Public Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 10975, 10975 (2009); see also 
Brosch, supra note 201. 
205.  Brosch, supra note 201, at 234. 
206.  “While the person taking the picture may retain a copyright, Facebook 
users grants Facebook ‘a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use any content that [the user] post[s] on or in connection 
with Facebook.’ This means that Facebook can license a user's content to others 
freely without obtaining any other approval from the user. Once a user's pictures 
or videos are shared on Facebook, the content remains in backup copies.” See 
Jessica Ronay, Adults Post the Darndest Things: (Ctrl + Shift) Freedom of Speech to (Esc) 
Our Past, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 86 (2014). 
207.  Nucci v. Target Corp., 162 So. 3d 146, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
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settings that the user may have established.”208 If we do not have 
privacy rights in the “sharenting” photos parents post, then what 
about photographic evidence that raise suspicions of criminal 
activity?  
Somewhat shockingly, criminals often share information about 
their crimes on social media. Sometimes, photographs include 
images of co-conspirators, holding guns or drug paraphernalia on a 
public street, or boasting about the “hit” they just did.209 Whether 
or not the photograph is staged or real, posting these sorts of images 
is reckless, as prosecutors can use them to prove aspects of any 
criminal case. Specifically, they may be used to claim that the 
defendants are members of a gang, which may increase their 
sentence.210 If I am a co-conspirator in the picture who never agreed 
to have my photo taken, and in fact vehemently protested it being 
uploaded to Instagram, do I have a right for it not to be used against 
me? The answer is no. Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter are not de 
facto government databases. They are public and semi-public data 
warehouses, with scores of once-private information that law 
enforcement can exploit. The use of GEDMatch is not that different 
from a Facebook user with lax privacy settings, whose posts all 
default to “public.” If detectives search that user’s Facebook profile 
and find incriminating photographs or posts, they are not doing an 
“end-run” around the Fourth Amendment. They are taking 
advantage of a legal source of data.  
6. Debunking the Claim That Individuals Do Not Want to 
Participate in GEDMatch to Help Solve Cold Cases 
While we probably should not rely on what consumers want 
when crafting privacy policies, as many are unaware of privacy 
risks,211 it is simply not the case that most Americans find FGG 
creepy and dystopian. Banning FGG denies many people the 
opportunity to assist in cracking cold cases. While many speculate 
 
208.  Id. at 153-54. 
209.  See Post, Shoot, INVISIBILIA (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:03 AM), 
www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=700738025; see also 
Aaron Leibowitz, Chicago Public Schools Monitored Social Media for Signs of Violence, 
Gang Membership, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 11, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
www.propublica.org/article/chicago-public-schools-social-media-monitoring-
violence-gangs. 
210.  Tony Rizzo, Most Gang Members Use Social Media, Study Finds, GOVTECH 
(Oct. 15, 2013), www.govtech.com/public-safety/Most-Gang-Members-Use-
Social-Media-Study-Finds.html. 
211.  Sara E. Brown, An Illusory Expectation of Privacy: The ECPA is Insufficient to 
Provide Meaningful Protection for Advanced Communication Tools, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 
277, 290 (2011) (“Evidence suggests that few users read privacy policies let alone 
change default settings.”). 
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that being a genetic informant against their distant relatives would 
be disdainful, the truth is that most people support this use, and some 
even want to actively participate. When the developers of 
GEDMatch first heard about the site’s role in arresting the Golden 
State Killer, they expected to quickly hemorrhage users. They 
certainly did not envision an outpouring of support. However, they 
received “5,000 new uploads to the site shortly after Mr. DeAngelo’s 
arrest—a daily record.”212 It is clear that not only do the large 
majority of Americans support FGG, especially when used to solve 
violent cases,213 but that banning this methodology would result in 
far fewer cold cases being solved.  
7. Debunking the Claim That FGG Mandates Familial Consent, 
Where Other Intimate Sharing About Family Members Does 
Not  
Thoughtful scholars writing in this area have suggested that 
family members ought to get the consent of relatives before 
uploading their information to sites like GEDMatch.214 Even some 
clinical researchers have proposed requiring familial consent, given 
that hereditary diseases run in families and the information therefore 
implicates multiple branches in the family tree. Their rationale is 
that genetic information is unlike other data that we enthusiastically 
share online because genetic data is immutable, and sharing one’s 
data exposes the data of one’s relatives without their consent.  
 
Not so fast. A relative’s genotype cannot be neatly predicted 
for most complex traits, given how random and noisy inheritance 
can be. This is an important point that needs to be underscored. 
Having access to my mother’s DNA does not tell you whether I am 
a carrier for any particular disease or whether I will be affected by a 
genetic mutation. Put more simply, if you knew my mom had the 
genes for blue eyes, that does not tell you whether I have those same 
genes, or whether my eyes are, in fact, blue. Since most traits are not 
autosomal dominant and do not follow simple Mendelian genetics, 
knowing about someone’s SNPs will not tell you much about their 
cousins’ genetic mutations or health risks.  
 
 
212.  Murphy, supra note 65. 
213.  Guerrini, supra note 8 (Among 1587 respondents, the majority 
supported police searches of genetic websites that identify genetic relatives (79%) 
and disclosure of DTC genetic testing consumer information to police (65%). 
Respondents were much more supportive when the purpose was to identify 
perpetrators of violent crimes (80%), crimes against children (78%) or missing 
persons (77%) than when used to apprehend non-violent crimes (39%)). 
214.  Ram, supra note 12; Susan Wallace et al., Family Tree and Ancestry Inference: 
Is There a Need for a Generational Consent?, 16 BMC MED. ETHICS 87 (2015). 
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Despite these aforementioned caveats, there remains 
significant concern about the ability of our relatives to spill our 
collective genetics beans. One of the major critiques of FGG is that 
your relatives could expose your genetic information or could place 
you under criminal suspicion through their genealogical research 
without your consent. But this is fear-mongering.  
 
The “you” in question here is the donor of semen or blood 
taken from a crime scene or a rape kit. It is the criminal’s own actions 
that placed his or her DNA under scrutiny. It may be true that the 
criminal’s name could only be revealed by virtue of his or her 
relative’s contribution to a DTC genetics website. But it was not the 
GEDMatch user’s actions that first placed the suspect under 
scrutiny. This focuses too much on the reliable identification 
methodology, rather than the criminal’s actus reus.  
 
The risk of inadvertent third-party disclosure is much greater 
with genetically simpler diseases. Knowing that my mother has an 
autosomal trait tells you quite a bit about me and greatly increases 
the risk that I will either express or carry the trait. But even then, 
whether my mother decides to share her genetic disease with others 
is her choice. While ethically it would be more appropriate for my 
mother to consult with her close, affected family members before 
sharing this information with others, it is ultimately her story to tell.  
 
Outside of pedigree and identification, we should be 
concerned about more nefarious uses by law enforcement or private 
actors. If the mutations are highly penetrant, quite heritable, and 
extremely deleterious, we might reasonably be very worried about 
other people having access to some small and unknown subsect of 
our genetic information that we never consented to share. Even in 
these cases, however, analogies to public disclosure of private facts 
cases suggests that the GEDMatch users would not be liable for 
uploading their SNP profile to a public site.  
c. The Tenancy by the Entirety Analogy Is Not a Good Fit for 
the Reality of Genetic Information 
Legal analysis often turns on which metaphor you select. In 
a powerful article by Natalie Ram, Ram suggests that we conceive 
DNA through a property framework, considering the insights 
provided by the doctrinal metaphor of “tenancy by the entirety.”215 
Ram creatively argues that just as tenancy by the entirety forbids 
one spouse from encumbering shared property without the other 
 
215.  Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 918–19 
(2015). 
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spouse’s consent, so too should familial database matching.216 The 
government’s storage and use of “source-excluding partial matches 
would encumber the portions of identifiable genetic information 
shared between known offenders and their close genetic relatives[,]” 
and thus require the innocent relative’s consent.217 The tenancy by 
the entirety concept is clever, but it does not track DNA interests 
very well. For one, we do not “own” our DNA in a technical sense, 
even though some DTC sites claim that their users own their 
genomic information. It is not real property, which turns out to 
matter, as we cannot sell or alter the property rights. More 
important, however, is the fact that individual DNA mutations do 
not have much value on their own. With the exception of just a 
handful of diseases, we must know more about the other protective 
and deleterious mutations on other alleles in order to process what 
a particular mutation likely means. We also would need to know 
more about the individual’s diet, history, and life experiences. The 
property framework overstates our ability to value any isolated piece 
of DNA.  
 
Also, practically speaking, we are not required to obtain the 
consent of our family members when we undergo genetic testing or 
receive test results. These results might implicate a relative’s health 
interests, such as when a mother tests positive for BRCA-1, which 
marks an increased risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer. For 
purposes of a tort duty to disclose, courts often expect that if any 
duty exists, it likely resides with the family member proband, who is 
expected to communicate these BRCA-1 results to their 
daughters.218 Of course, this expectation might be misplaced. But if 
a duty exists at all, it does not require the proband to keep her 
information private. Rather, it suggests we might have duties to 
disclose this information to others. This recognizes that privacy 
interests are different when it comes to genetic risk, which is 
analogized in these cases to communicable disease.219 
 
Further, courts cannot be expected to disentangle the 
property interests shared even by close relatives like sisters, as they 
share different percentages of genetics among and between them. 
 
216.  Id. (Familial database searching “constitutes an unlawful effort by the 
government to encumber not only an offender’s interest in her identifiable 
genetic information, but also the interest of the offender's closest kin.”). 
217.  Id. at 920. 
218.  See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 291 N.J. Super. 619, 625 (N.J. Super. 
Court. App. Div. 1996). For a general discussion of the tort duties to warn family 
members of genetic risk, see Teneille R. Brown, Needles, Haystacks and Next-
Generation Genetic Sequencing, 28 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 263 (2018). 
219.  Safer, 291 N.J. Super. at 625 (“There is no essential difference between 
the type of genetic threat at issue here and the menace of infection, contagion or 
a threat of physical harm.”). 
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This would become even more unwieldy if we were instead 
discussing property rights in shared regions of homozygosity 
hovering around 1-2% of the genome, which would vary from one 
cousin to another.220 Would the property right be determined at the 
level of the SNP, or at the level of the collective, polygenic risk? Or 
only for SNPs that predict clinically actionable traits? The fact that 
we still do not know much about the connection between genotypes 
and phenotypes suggests that a property framework will not work. 
Finally, because our genetic information is increasingly being used 
for precision medicine, these applications implicate autonomy and 
substantive due process much more than encumbrances on shared 
real estate.221 Substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment would likely prevent governments from requiring the 
permission of each sibling before making autonomous, 
individualized health care decisions.222 While it might be ethically 
appropriate for probands to discuss their genetic test results with 
family members and request permission from them before sharing 
those results with others, their results are currently their own.  
 
Rather than analogizing DNA to property, an analogy to 
non-genetic information seems to make more sense. After all, what 
is concerning to privacy scholars is the use of this DNA to make 
interpretations, however shaky, about someone’s ancestry, identity, 
or health risks. It is not the DNA, qua DNA, that is protected. It is 
the translation from DNA mutations to our health and identity that 
contains informational value.223 Thus, metaphors sounding in 
disclosure of information, rather than encumbrance of property, are 
probably more useful for thinking about the legal implications of 
sharing genetic data.  
 
220.  But see Ram, supra note 12 (“[C]ourts should look to other forms of 
shared material to illuminate analysis about when an individual has a sufficient 
interest in searched genetic data that does not derive from their own cells.”). 
221.  Alessandro Blasimme & Effy Vayena, Becoming Partners, Retaining 
Autonomy: Ethical Considerations on the Development of Precision Medicine, 17 BMC MED. 
ETHICS 67 (2016). 
222.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 
2844 (1990). (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of 
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law. This notion of bodily integrity has been 
embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally required for 
medical treatment.”). 
223.  Julyan Cartright et al., DNA As Information: At the Crossroads Between 
Biology, Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, 374 PHIL. TRANS R. SOC. 20150071, *7 
(2015) (“The genetic code is not a book nor part of it; rather, it is a translation 
dictionary between two different worlds (languages), i.e., the world of nucleic 
acids and the world of proteins . . . Moreover, little is known about the 
grammar, the syntax, and even the orthography of the book of life.”). 
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d. The Metaphor of Memoir Provides a Much More Useful 
Framework for Analyzing Genetic Privacy in This Domain 
Autobiography provides a very useful, if imperfect, 
metaphor for the sharing of our genetic information with others. Just 
as the memoirist reveals information that is mostly “her story,” she 
is also telling part of the private stories of others, who never 
consented to this story being told. Further, just as with 
autobiography, the genetic story told by the author is colored by 
each sibling’s unique contribution and idiosyncratic perspective.224 
If an account or memory is disputed, it is difficult for the reader to 
unravel the different threads to determine which part of the story is 
true and whether the sources are reliable. One First Amendment 
scholar argues this gives memoirs greater, rather than less, narrative 
power.225  
 
This sort of imperfect accounting is also true for the 
information shared in our genomes. Even close relatives like siblings 
have very different genomes, or genetic stories, that cannot be 
surmised from our own. Furthermore, it can be difficult to determine 
what we share versus what is unique. Even still, outside readers 
might draw inferences about a heritable trait and presume that we 
are carriers until proven otherwise, so we might expect family 
members to keep this sort of information private. Finally, just like 
with genetics, our family story is what it is, and it cannot be changed. 
Of course, we can reinterpret our history and memories, but the 
facts that underlie them exist in the past and are immutable. Once 
someone knows about a private aspect of our past, such as our 
parents abusing drugs or that we were conceived through rape, we 
cannot change these facts, just as we cannot presently change our 
autosomal genes. 
 
There is a flourishing memoir ethics literature that discusses 
how authors ought to tell their stories, knowing that in so doing they 
are divulging others’ secrets.226 F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night 
is a gut-wrenching autobiographical account of his wife’s sad descent 
 
224.  See Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical 
Speech, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 905, 933 (2006). 
 “This ambiguity over the truth or falsity of memories is even more 
pronounced when the stories involve not just provable facts but human 
relationships, emotions, or reactions…[t]hus, there might be argument that 
there is something uniquely valuable about individual memories, perceptions, 
and viewpoints on personal life events regardless of their verifiable accuracy. 
Under this view, autobiographical speech might be deserving of protection 
beyond the boundaries of basic defamation law.” 
225.  Id. 
226.  Carolyn Ellis, Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives, 13 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 
3, 14 (2007). 
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into madness. While many readers appreciated the honesty of the 
story, some questioned Fitzgerald’s “right to violate Zelda’s privacy, 
with no realistic opportunity either for consent or for telling her story 
her own way.”227 In the present context of genetics, researcher and 
author Alex Wexler wrote a loving memoir about her mother’s 
Huntington’s disease and her own research to help discover its 
genetic causes.228 Recognizing the moral complexity of her memoir, 
Wexler grappled with the “potentially severe consequences [of her 
disclosures] for people she cares about.”229  
 
There are certainly ethical quandaries authors face when 
choosing to tell their stories that implicate the stories of their parents 
and siblings. Sometimes auto-biographies include intensely personal 
accounts of rape,230 addiction,231 or incest232 that occurred in the 
family home, which other family members would rather keep 
private. But even in these cases where the shared content is deeply 
sensitive and potentially embarrassing, the courts have almost 
always sided with the authors.233 The individual’s First Amendment 
right to “tell her story” usually trumps the family member’s 
expectation of privacy. This is true even when the subject whose 
 
227.  Martha Montello, Confessions and Transgressions: Ethics and Life Writing, 36 
HASTINGS CENT. REP. 46, 46 (2006). 
228.  Alex Wexler, Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, Risk, and Genetic Research, 
U. CAL. PRESS (1996). 
229.  Montello, supra note 227. 
230.  “The Court must believe that the First Amendment greatly 
circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the 
publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind 
that people want very much to conceal.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 
1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing a rape victim being identified in a book as 
being unable to bring a public disclosure of private facts claim against the 
publisher). 
231.  “This is my story…It's not my mother's story and it's not the family's 
story, and they may remember things differently and they may choose to not 
remember certain things, but I will never forget what happened to me, ever, and 
I have the scars from it and I wanted to rip those scars off of me.” Buzz 
Bissinger, Ruthless with Scissors, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2007, at 104, 108 (quoting 
author of Running with Scissors, Augusten Burroughs, describing why he wrote the 
piece). 
232.  Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. App. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1128 (1994). 
233.  “[T]here is an additional interest in this case: Kaysen's right to disclose 
her own intimate affairs. In this case, it is critical that Kaysen was not a 
disinterested third party telling Bonome's personal story in order to develop the 
themes in her book. Rather, she is telling her own personal story-which 
inextricably involves Bonome in an intimate way. In this regard, several courts 
have held that where an autobiographical account related to a matter of 
legitimate public interest reveals private information concerning a third party, 
the disclosure is protected so long as there is a sufficient nexus between those 
private details and the issue of public concern.” Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 
2004 WL 1194731, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2004). 
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private information is being revealed had no part in the construction 
of the memoir.234 One court went even further, suggesting that 
whether or not the underlying material is newsworthy is irrelevant 
to whether the author has the right to reveal “her own identity.”235 
It is presumed that she possesses this right, even if exercising it means 
revealing private information about those close to her. 
 
These cases are instructive as applied to our genomic 
information. When I choose to obtain genetic tests to complete my 
genetic story, either to assist in precision genetics treatments or to 
connect with distant relatives, I am writing my story. I am gathering 
information and sharing it because it is my autonomous choice. This 
decision might indirectly implicate the privacy of others, and it 
might hurt them. Consider for example, a family who identifies as 
Native American only to discover through genetic ancestry testing, 
that there is no evidence, at least according to Ancestry’s algorithm, 
that this family folklore is true. Do I have a privacy interest in my 
family’s ancestry story? Perhaps. Will the law recognize this and 
protect it from disclosure by a family member? No. Just as with 
memoir, where “it is often difficult, if not impossible, to separate 
one's intimate and personal experiences from the people with whom 
those experiences are shared,” it is likewise difficult to separate out 
which traits or SNPs run in your family, what those SNPs predict in 
isolation and in your particular pedigree, and what that shared 
genetic information reveals about any one person.236 Put differently, 
Alex Wexler can certainly publish her story about her family’s 
experience with Huntington’s disease without being liable for an 
invasion of privacy claim. The case law is clear on this point. 
However, we are dealing with an even more amorphous kind of 
privacy threat. When my genetic story becomes even less concrete, 
and involves describing potential genetic risks rather than actual 
disease symptoms, the right to privacy for my relatives becomes even 
weaker.  
 
Of course, one could argue that when police surreptitiously 
submit crime-scene DNA samples, they are forcing someone else to 
“tell their story” and connect with family members against their 
wishes. In one sense, this is true. But once again, given that the DNA 
is significant evidence of having committed a criminal actus reus, the 
 
234.  There is a First Amendment privilege to publish truthful information of 
legitimate public concern, and the privilege encompasses dissemination of 
information relating even to individuals who have not sought or who have 
attempted to avoid publicity. See Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
235.  Anonsen, 857 S.W.2d at 705. 
236.  Bonome, 2004 WL 1194731, at *6. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
54 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. [Vol. XXI 
privacy rights in that DNA are substantially diminished.237 It hardly 
seems controversial ethically, and is certainly true legally, that a 
criminal has relinquished the right to tell his own story with his 
DNA. The law is utilitarian when it comes to privacy, not absolute. 
Because the purpose was to identify a murderer, the public certainly 
has an interest in the disclosure of the crime-scene DNA to 
GEDMatch to find a relative, if not in knowing its specific content.238 
 
In conclusion, existing law would not require anything like 
familial consent before law enforcement could use FGG. Genomes 
are individually unique constructions, and the value of an entirely 
different genome, with a different combination of mutations and life 
experiences, cannot meaningfully be compared through the tenancy 
by the entirety metaphor. Assuming that our genes have 
independent property value, without any accompanying 
information about environmental risk or the interactive effects of our 
genes, relies on genetic determinism, wherein we assume we can 
know someone from their genes alone.239  
 
Despite its allure, the property metaphor (which I assume is 
not meant to be literally implemented) just does not work well in the 
context of sensitive and highly idiosyncratic DNA information. 
Specifically, alienation, valuation, transfer, license, sale, etc., would 
be unwieldy. Not only does the case law make clear that family 
members can reveal photographs and private, scandalous family 
histories, but it really must be this way.  
 
If family members were required to obtain the consent of 
their relatives before obtaining genetic test results or sharing them, 
would that extend only to immediate family members, or to anyone 
with shared DNA, including some holdout who could be a fourth 
cousin? Could a fourth cousin keep me from sharing my BRCA-1 
results with my granddaughters? Given that most people do not 
consider their fourth cousins to be within the boundary of their 
“family,” and given that without a service like Ancestry they would 
likely not even know who these fourth cousins were, it is a bit 
preposterous to suggest that their consent would be legally (as 
opposed to ethically) required ex ante.  
 
 
237.  Hodge, supra note 146. 
238.  “[A]n involuntary loss of privacy is recognized in the modern 
formulations of this branch of the privacy tort, which require not only that the 
private facts publicized be such as would make a reasonable person deeply 
offended by such publicity but also that they be facts in which the public has no 
legitimate interest.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
239.  This concept will be discussed in more detail in Section H. 
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Most importantly, in the context of precision medicine, it 
would be appalling to require an individual to receive her siblings’ 
consent before undergoing genetic testing. Even without genetic 
testing, information about particular diseases (such as breast cancer, 
or depression) is already known to run in families. Family members 
often know their history; the genetic information may just confirm 
whether they are a carrier or at risk, but it’s not a surprise that this 
risk is familial. Given the way this risk data is understood and 
communicated, an approach that treats it like information is far 
preferable.  
G. Why Do Scholars Fear Genetic Informants? 
1. Our Fear of Genetic Informants Reflects Moral 
Dumbfounding  
As explained in the sections above, very few of the privacy 
concerns surrounding FGG stand up to scrutiny. In many cases, the 
arguments against FGG illustrate a form of “moral 
dumbfounding,”240 where opponents find the method morally 
questionable but cannot locate a good argument as to why. Jonathan 
Haidt described this phenomenon as thinking like a “lawyer trying 
to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth.”241 Moral 
dumbfounding leads to weak rationalizations for things that seem 
intuitively immoral (and may indeed be immoral, but for reasons we 
cannot articulate).  
 
In some cases, critiques of FGG, based on an intuitive sense 
that it is immoral, have worked. Legislators in Maryland proposed 
bans on this useful prosecutorial tool because of inflated privacy 
concerns. These concerns reflect a misunderstanding of criminal 
procedure and of the status quo ante. The fact that such bright legal 
minds can be so confused about the actual privacy implications of 
FGG intimates that there is something deeper at work. This is more 
than just a failure to analyze case law precedent on the Fourth 
Amendment, witness testimony, the police use of deception, or the 
invasion of privacy.  
 
2. Our Fear of Genetic Informants Reflects Genetic Essentialism 
 
240.  Jonathan Haidt et al., Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No 
Reason, in 1 No. 2 LUND PSYCH. REP. 1, 1–29 (Dep’t of Psychology, Lund Univ. 
ed., 2000). 
241.  Joshua May & Victor Kumar, Moral Reasoning and Emotion, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 139, 142 (Karen Jones et 
al. eds., 2019). 
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The reason, I suggest, that leads to these fears is subconscious 
endorsement of genetic essentialism. First, essentialist thinking leads 
people to believe that genetic explanations are truly exceptional. 
Therefore, relevant precedent is immediately and always 
distinguishable. Second, it leads people to believe that genes are 
more deterministic than they actually are. This in turn encourages 
an overemphasis of genetic causes of behavior over environmental 
factors and a need to protect these immutable blueprints from 
disclosure. Third, when people think about genes in essentialist 
ways, they may adopt genetic vitalism, where an almost mythic 
agency or intentionality is attributed to our genes. Vitalism may 
explain the view that FGG is “dystopian” or “creepy,” as we 
consider our genes to be unintentional informants. This might 
explain why some fail to disambiguate the inanimate DNA from the 
individuals’ actions, which allowed others to access the DNA. 
 
Essentialist thinking has been demonstrated in many 
different cultures and contexts. We all engage in it to a degree. 
However, some people are more essentialist than others, and some 
topics, such as genetics, tribalism, or race, lead people to engage in 
more rigidly essentialist thinking. Essentialists find greater causal 
power in people’s fixed characters than in their surroundings, and 
assume that much of one’s behavior can be explained with reference 
to the essence that they have.242 This sort of thinking is on display 
when we think that something represents “who we truly are,” in a 
way that is “deep down and internal,” “naturally determined,” 
which “draws the boundaries” between social groups, and can be 
“transferred from individual to individual while preserving their 
original identity.”243 Natural things have an essence; synthetic things 
do not. In this way, essences are often conceived of as something like 
a soul, like chi in Chinese cultures or prana among Hindus.244 Given 
these chief features, it is no wonder that genetics so handily lends 
itself to essentialism.  
 
It seems some of the critiques of FGG sound in the type of 
genetic essentialism that treats genetics as completely exceptional. 
This might explain why scholars have failed to properly consider 
precedent regarding privacy and criminal procedure. They may 
assume that our genomes cannot be properly analogized to anything 
that has come before. In some ways, our genomes are special and present 
novel concerns about privacy. Namely, while we might disclose our 
genomes today, the predictive power of our genomes will continue 
 
242.  Steven Heine et al., Essentially Biased: Why People are Fatalistic About Genes, 
55 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 142 (2017). 
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to grow. Ten years from now, we will likely know even more about 
disease risk and penetrance than we do now, and that makes sharing 
genetic data related to disease risk very different. However, when 
SNP data are used to identify relatives, it is not taking on a form that 
is radically different from public archives, peer-to-peer sharing of 
pornographic files, or searching of social media posts. When it comes 
to the ways genetics is being used in the service of FGG, there are 
no sufficiently strong reasons to justify its exceptional treatment.  
 
Genetic essentialism leads people to do a number of strange 
things. For one, they will “over-attribute a person’s characteristics 
and behaviours, in all of their complexity, to their genetic 
makeup,”245 and they will tend to view genetic risk factors as being 
more causal, or deterministic of outcomes, than they actually are.246 
This has the related effect of discounting other causes of disease, 
behavior, or identity, such as culture, diet, or the environment.247 
There are a handful of diseases wherein genes operate in hard, 
deterministic ways, and for which you could actually have “a gene 
for” the disorder that means you will definitely develop that 
condition. These Mendelian traits are actually pretty rare. Even so, 
“people overgeneralize from these to the far more common 
conditions where genes are not at all deterministic.”248  
  
Genetic determinism might move us to accord genes more 
heightened privacy protections than are warranted for their specific 
use. In the deterministic view, genes are perceived to so completely 
control our future that this justifies our need to keep them secret. I 
strongly suspect that some of the “moral dumbfounding” 
surrounding FGG has to do with precisely this. We worry about 
people having access to genetic information because we assume that 
there is a one-to-one relationship between genotype and phenotype, 
and that if we have a mutation that increases the risk of depression 
or addiction, we will certainly develop depression and addiction.249 
This makes genetic information much more sensitive, as it is 
perceived to provide a crystal ball for our future.  
 
 
245.  Ilan Dar-Nimrod et al., Genetic Knowledge Within a National Australian 
Sample: Comparisons with Other Diverse Populations, 21 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 
133, 134 (2019). 
246.  Wren Gould & Steven Heine, Implicit Essentialism: Genetic Concepts Are 
Implicitly Associated With Fate Concepts, PLOS ONE, June 2012, at 1. 
247.  Ilan Dar-Nimrod & Steven J. Heine, Genetic Essentialism: On the Deceptive 
Determinism of DNA, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 800, 800 (2011). 
248.  Heine, supra note 242, at 150. 
249.  Id.; see also Mark Henderson, ‘Fat’ Gene Found by Scientists, THE TIMES 
(U.K) Apr. 13, 2007, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/fat-gene-found-by-scientists-
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In reality, the SNPs that are used to make disease predictions 
explain very little of the variance between individuals, so this data is 
currently of limited individual predictive value.250 Most complex 
diseases are caused by many different mutations that interact with 
one another in as-yet-unknown ways. DTC results also fail to 
capture varying genetic expression, which is affected by lifestyle 
choices and environmental risks.251 However, for some diseases, 
such as Alzheimer’s, the identified variants are linked to a substantial 
increase in the risk of developing that disease, and they are thus more 
clinically useful. In the future, DTC companies might rely on 
sequencing the entire genome, which would provide vastly more 
information on rare diseases than that which is gleaned from just 
SNPs alone. The potential for using genetics in increasingly 
predictive ways means we should be mindful of the privacy and 
security of our genetic data. But this sort of prediction is not 
inherently at stake with FGG. 
Long before we knew about the structure of the double helix, 
biologists debated whether biology could be explained solely by the 
principles of physics and chemistry.252 Many eighteenth and 
nineteenth century biologists theorized that biology contained 
metaphysical and spiritual properties, which might never be 
knowable through the laws of the hard sciences. This came to be 
known as “vitalism,” where biological processes were imbued with 
agency, desires, and ultimate goals.253 Vitalism is now largely 
discredited and dismissed as superstitious.254 Even so, vitalism is alive 
and well in our folk understandings of biology. Without being able 
to prove this directly, I suspect that some of our suspicions of the 
“genetic informant” or the “biowitness” have to do with our subtle 
and subconscious misattribution of agency and intent to our genes. 
Anthropomorphism is a “false positive bias” where we over-
attribute human-like characteristics such as agency, intention, 
purpose, or volition, to objects that possess no such capacities.255 It 
can happen with inanimate objects, as well as with non-sentient 
organisms. Even if it is incorrect, it is the result of an over-active and 
fascinatingly adaptive cognitive process.256 Because the 
 
250.  Park et al., supra note 27. 
251.  Bunnik et al., supra note 43, at 344. 
252.  Marc Kirschner et al., Molecular Vitalism, 100 CELL 79, 79 (2000). 
253.  Monica Greco, On the Vitality of Vitalism, 22 THEORY, CULTURE & 
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254.  Id. at 15. 
255.  Marco Antonio Correa Varella, The Biology and Evolution of the Three 
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PSYCHOL., Oct. 2018, at 1. 
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anthropomorphism tendency is so pervasive, involuntary, and 
deeply-rooted, it is studied in many different disciplines. Within 
cognitive psychology, it is called “teleological obsession” or 
“overactive intentionality bias,” and is employed to explain why 
people presume intentionality where there is no evidence of its 
presence.257 Within psychiatry, it is known as “hyper-mentalizing” 
where it sheds light on why people with schizophrenia or other 
mental illnesses might imbue mailboxes and computers with secret 
intentions and surveillance capacities.258 As applied to biological 
processes, this tendency is often referred to as vitalism.259 Regardless 
of what you call it, there is consensus that anthropomorphism is 
expressed at such a young age, and is so powerful and automatic, 
that it feels (and may indeed be) innately hardwired.260 We can 
therefore be forgiven for engaging in the particular form of 
anthropomorphism that implicitly recognizes intentional action in 
our genes.  
If one thinks of FGG as employing DNA as “genetic informants” 
or “biological witnesses,”261 it calls to mind something out of a 
dystopian science fiction novel. The use of these 
anthropomorphizing labels suggests that it is in fact the DNA itself 
that is testifying against you. This is of course deeply unnerving, in 
part because of humanity’s inherent desire to control its 
environments. If an independent and intentional genetic informant 
can speak for us in this way, this reveals something profoundly 
scary—that we humans are not fully in control of our actions or their 
consequences. This is particularly troubling when the consequences 
seem so great. Rather than being able to decide whether to implicate 
our relatives in a crime, our genes are seemingly making this decision 
for us, without our consent. I suspect that this phenomenon is also 
at the root of our response to FGG. 
Viewing FGG as employing “genetic informants,” as many 
of its opponents do, exploits the psychological fear of losing control 
of our environment and our free will.262 Humans have a strong 
desire to “master their environments by increasing the 
environment’s predictability” through its “apparent 
controllability.”263 Put simply, if we are not controlling our genes, 
we fear that they are controlling us. The need to feel in control of 
our environments is referred to as “effectance motivation,” and is a 
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big driver of anthropomorphism.264 Attributing human-like 
properties to biological entities enables a sense of familiarity and, 
therefore, control over them.265 This in turn provides a feeling of 
comfort when interacting with these agents.266 Ironically, we employ 
anthropomorphisms to make us less afraid of losing control. 
However, because our brains evolved to over-apply it in novel 
contexts, it can actually make us more afraid of unintentional agents, 
like robots or genes.267 
 
Of course, our genes are not intentionally testifying against 
us. But given the pervasiveness of anthropomorphizing, especially 
toward a biological phenomenon like genes, it would not be at all 
surprising if this causes our strong negative reaction to FGG. The 
language of the “genetic informant” or “biowitness” unnecessarily 
imbues the DNA with properties that it does not possess. For our 
purposes, these terms are misleading because they obfuscate the 
intentional actions of ordinary people. 
III. CONCLUSION: REFORMS THAT BETTER ADDRESS THE REAL 
PRIVACY CONCERNS OF FGG, WITHOUT HAMPERING THE 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES 
Secondary use of genetic information by private actors 
without consent should certainly give us pause. And the unlimited 
potential uses by the government should also generate considerable 
worry. But by focusing on the Fourth Amendment concerns of FGG 
when it is used exclusively by law enforcement to identify the 
perpetrators of crime, privacy advocates emphasize the wrong 
privacy boogeymen and thus propose the wrong remedy. We should 
not ban FGG when used to identify suspects in cold cases. We might, 
however, decide that DTC genetic companies, while technically 
consumer enterprises, might share enough features with clinical care 
to legally require additional consent measures before people 
participate. We might also limit the secondary uses of DTC genetic 
information in some meaningful ways. I briefly sketch out the 
justifications for these very different reforms below.  
a. Statutory Secondary Use Restrictions 
I suspect it would be different if, rather than using regions of 
homozygosity and ancestry information, law enforcement 
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connected the family through a rare and serious disease mutation 
that ran through the family, and was evidenced in health records or 
a SNP profile. If law enforcement identified and publicized that the 
GEDMatch user was affected, this would likely run afoul of legally 
recognized privacy rights. But even if this had been the case, there is 
no indication that law enforcement would ever need to reveal the 
rare mutation discovery to the GEDMatch user, just as they never 
identified Joseph DeAngelo’s distant relative who provided the 
genetic connection that led to his arrest.  
 
The possibility that law enforcement, or other commercial 
entities, could glean clinically relevant information from 
GEDMatch profiles is troubling. And yet, because users voluntarily 
uploaded their SNP data to an open-access, amateur genealogical 
website, they have no recourse under existing law, at least against 
secondary data users.268 In order to better address this sort of harm, 
we must educate consumers more about the vast amounts of data 
they are sharing with sites like GEDMatch, or even 23andMe and 
Ancestry. There also should be significant secondary use limitations 
that delineate how law enforcement may and may not use the 
genetic profiles that they, and other private actors, have obtained. 
Perhaps we need a federal statute that allows law enforcement or 
private entities to use these SNP profiles only to identify perpetrators 
after they have committed crimes, to identify the remains of bodies, 
or to reunite displaced persons or victims of human trafficking with 
their families. There could conceivably be limitations on the types of 
crimes for which it could be used, based on political sentiment.  
 
As far as we know, law enforcement has not yet used SNP 
data to do anything other than identify suspects of serious crimes. If 
we fear that law enforcement could use this data to predict health 
traits or conduct internal research, then the solution is not to ban 
 
268.  The relatives of the family member (proband) who uploaded her data 
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FGG. It is not just the police who have access to this rich SNP data. 
Anyone who has access to SNP profiles could upload genetic SNP data 
to a public site and search for the sample’s relatives. This is because 
GEDMatch and FamilyTreeDNA do not require any identity 
authentication.  
 
Rather than banning FGG, the solution to this sort of 
problem is to craft thoughtful legislation that limits certain 
secondary uses of DTC genetic information. Obvious candidates 
would be prohibiting the use of SNP data to price health, life or 
disability insurance, or increasing the fines associated with detection 
of these uses. Unfortunately, the federal statute prohibiting the use 
of genetic information to make health insurance coverage or 
employment decisions might not account for low detection rates, 
and the scope of GINA’s broad exceptions have been insufficiently 
fleshed out.269 Another candidate would be requiring specific 
consent to use samples in research. A large part of 23andMe’s 
business model rests on the secondary use of genetic samples for 
health research. By sharing SNP data with outside researchers, 
promising research is being pursued that will help us treat cancer or 
heart disease more effectively. Not all secondary uses are sinister. 
But we might reconsider the model where simple disclosure of many 
terms and acceptance by consumers is considered legally sufficient.  
b. Mandatory Updates of the Consent Process for DTC Genetic 
Tests 
Multiple reviews of the consent process for DTC genetic 
testing reveal that the user agreements and consent procedures are 
wholly inadequate, especially given that no physician is made 
available to explain the risks and benefits.270 There is a reason that 
countries like France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Portugal 
demand that physicians be involved in the ordering of any genetic 
test.271 Regulators in those countries appreciate the enormous risks 
posed by the inappropriate delivery and interpretation of this sort of 
information. Consumers of DTC genetic tests may not understand 
how to interpret the various findings. There are mutations 
associated with tiny relative risk increases, mutations with unknown 
expression or population penetrance (because many DTC tests are 
 
269.  Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future 
of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 728 (2019). For example, employers can use 
genetic information that they obtain inadvertently or via commercially available 
documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries. 
270.  Clayton et al., supra note 14. 
271.  Louiza Kalokairinou et al., Legislation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
in Europe: A Fragmented Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. COMMUNITY GENETICS 117, 123 
(2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3549640
2020] WHY WE FEAR GENETIC INFORMANTS 63 
run in asymptomatic individuals, the likelihood of someone 
developing the disease associated with a mutation is unknown), or 
mutations of unknown significance. Further, DTC tests have varying 
levels of laboratory and clinical quality. Some are not reliable, 
meaning that many runs of the test will produce varying results, and 
some are not valid, meaning that the results do not mean what we 
think they do. We also might worry about this sort of sensitive 
information being relayed without the possibility of counseling to put 
the findings in context. For these reasons and others, many countries 
require that genetic susceptibility tests only be performed as part of 
clinical care. These countries therefore require physician 
involvement and patient-informed consent.272  
 
A recent review of European regulations found that fourteen 
countries had specific requirements for informed consent for DTC 
genetic testing. Some of these countries require meaningful 
disclosure of all relevant risks and benefits, a right “not to know” the 
information should they change their mind before the results are 
delivered, and appropriate time be given before the test and after 
disclosure for the individual to consider consenting.273 There is 
considerable variation among countries regarding which DTC 
genetic tests require informed consent, what must be present in the 
consenting process, and the consequences of non-compliance. In 
Germany, for example, failing to provide advance, express written 
consent is punishable by imprisonment or a fine. 274 
 
Regrettably, the United States has not taken this approach. 
Instead, in the U.S., DTC genetic testing operates largely outside of 
the realm of “health care,” despite interacting with it in many ways. 
Consumers who undergo testing may become patients who seek 
physicians’ help confirming or interpreting the results. They also 
may use the testing to decide whether to have a preventative 
procedure like a hysterectomy or whether to become involved in 
clinical research. Another large number of them may never use the 
data in an officially clinical way, but it might subtly change the way 
they think about their health, and for-profit entities might exploit 
their data in ways that affect the individual’s access to care in the 
future. Even so, DTC testing in the U.S. is considered mostly 
recreational. Thus, testing generally does not require physician 
involvement or clinical informed consent. This is the root of the 
problem. Despite perhaps being ethically required, outside the 
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context of clinical care and research, the requirement for informed 
consent is not widely recognized.275 
 
As a result, a few different research teams have documented 
the consent processes for DTC consumer tests and found them 
troublingly flawed. Indeed, the use of the phrase “consent processes” 
is misleading, as most DTC genetic testing companies just employ 
user agreements that consumers must click on in order to use the 
services or website. Third-party sites like GEDMatch have been 
found to have particularly poor procedures for documenting 
agreement with the terms of service.276 For most DTC genetic tests, 
users find privacy protections important and desire control over the 
dissemination of their genetic information. However, they 
mistakenly assume that the DTC genetic companies are fully 
protecting their privacy rather than sharing their data with third-
party researchers.277 A study of DTC genetic testing companies 
targeting Canadian consumers found that “67% provided 
information insufficient for consumers to determine how their data 
and sample would be treated.”278 This is alarming, and certainly 
indicates that a significant part of our trouble with FGG might stem 
from concerns over meaningless consent at initial stages of testing. 
 
Although more companies now meet guidelines relating to 
transparency regarding data security protocols, few companies 
disclose which secondary uses of users’ data would be permitted, 
with whom they would contract, how long the information would be 
stored, and what might happen in the event that the company was 
sold or went bankrupt. This finding was supported by smaller, more 
in-depth studies, which revealed failures to convey the risks of re-
identification and to obtain proper consent for the secondary use of 
data.279 The privacy and security risks are critically important, given 
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the market value for this sort of data and the temptation for unsavory 
companies to hack into databases to glean genetic and phenotypic 
information for research.280 Unfortunately, these concerns have only 
been amplified with the increasing use of more modern and 
thorough genetic sequencing technologies.281 
 
It is not uncommon for commercial entities to exploit the 
appearance of being “medical” to confuse consumers into thinking 
the experience has the legitimacy and scientific backing of the 
healthcare system. Based on a review of their advertising practices, 
many DTC genetic testing companies seem to do exactly this.282 
Several were found to exploit the professional legitimacy of a clinical 
encounter to establish trust between the company and the consumer, 
while in their small print user agreement they disavowed many of 
the regulatory protections that come with clinical experiences such 
as informed consent, HIPAA compliance, and notification and 
opportunity to withdraw data if the user no longer wishes to 
participate in the research database.283 Clinical care obviously 
differs considerably from consumer advertising, both in its ethical 
and legal requirements. It is important for consumers to know what 
they are buying and sharing. 
 
Medical ethics requires that clinicians respect the autonomy 
of their patients by disclosing all relevant risks and benefits of a 
procedure or test before it is performed. This has become so standard 
that the law of every state now requires informed consent in order 
for physicians to be free from either negligence or battery liability. 
More modern takes on informed consent stress that disclosure, 
wherein the clinician provides information in written form and 
obtains a signature by the patient, should not be a mere formality. 
Rather, to affect meaningful informed consent, patients ought to be 
able to understand enough of the procedure to ask questions and 
have time to reflect before making a decision. They also ought to be 
given the opportunity to change their consent status, when possible.  
 
However, none of these legal or ethical standards have been 
found to apply to DTC companies because they are regulated as if 
they provide a purely commercial service. This is a mistake. It may 
be that part of the reaction to FGG lies in consumer discomfort with 
law enforcement having access to our genetic information, or a 
misunderstanding of who has access to this complex information in 
 
280.  Laestadius et al., supra note 279; Niemiec & Howard, supra note 279. 
281.  Niemiec & Howard, supra note 279. 
282.  Manuel Schaper & Silke Schicktanz, Medicine, Market and Communication: 
Ethical Considerations in Regard to Persuasive Communication in Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing Services, 19 BMC MED. ETHICS 56 (2018). 
283.  Id. 
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the first place. This suggests our consent process is not working, and 
for this and other reasons, it might be unwise to allow consumers to 
be tested “recreationally” for genetic mutations that carry potential 
for significant future non-recreational uses.  
 
Because genetic information is so complicated, it is not 
possible to provide all the relevant risk and benefit information in 
one setting, particularly if done online. Informed consent for DTC 
testing ought to include an initial layer of basic information on how 
the saliva sample will be obtained, the laboratory procedures, and 
what tests may be run on that sample.284 Customers should also be 
told about the risks of false positives, false negatives, and laboratory 
errors. If consumers affirmatively click to agree to these conditions, 
then a second layer of information should convey background 
knowledge on genetic expression and penetrance. This layer should 
include videos and images to simplify the complex information and 
identify and use some traits with high and low penetrance and 
expression as examples. Consumers should then be given notice on 
what others with this data can do with this information. This layer 
should include information about GINA, and what it protects. It can 
also describe how our genetic information does not change over the 
course of our lifetime and how this information could be used to 
identify us or others through methods like FGG. Again, the use of 
interactive videos might be useful to help illustrate the data behind 
these processes.  
 
Next, if someone is interested in pursuing genetic 
information about health risks, there ought to be another layer of 
consent where consumers are briefed on the different kinds of health 
risk data. Specifically, consumers should have to opt-in to receive 
carrier or susceptibility information regarding penetrant health 
traits, particularly for which there are no known treatments or for 
which there is a significant and negative prognosis for either 
themselves or their offspring. Examples of this would include 
disclosing risks of Huntington’s disease or Alzheimer’s disease.285 It 
is shocking that companies are not required to run these tests 
through a medical provider, given the potential psychological 
impacts of the results. 
 
Some consumers may altruistically wish to contribute their 
genetic information to a database used for research purposes. If 
consumers agree to participate in a commercial research database 
managed by the DTC company, and have their samples or personal 
information used by research teams, then another layer must explain 
 
284.  Bunnik et al., supra note 43. 
285.  Bunnik et al., supra note 43, at 345. 
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this process in detail. Consumers must be told what types of research 
might be conducted, what personal information of theirs will be 
used, how they might be later identified using this data, and with 
whom the data might be shared. Because genetic information—even 
when stripped of our names, birthdates, addresses, and other readily 
identifiable information—still has the potential to identify us and is 
immutable, consumers should have the opportunity to stop 
participation in this research at any time. Of course, this cannot 
undo the research and data sharing that has already occurred, but it 
is important in the event that a research company is sold to a less 
reputable company that one may then change the user agreement 
and protections.  
 
Third-party sites like GEDMatch should also require a more 
robust consent procedure. If the sites are not conducting the tests 
themselves, they would not need to discuss laboratory errors and the 
risks of false negatives and positives. However, they should still be 
required to explain with whom the data might be shared, how it will 
be stored, and what data security and privacy measures will be taken 
to encrypt the data. Even where data can be uploaded anonymously 
with a pseudonym, users should be informed of the risks of re-
identification by triangulating data from birth and death records and 
other accessible genetic databases. 
 
Regardless of which mutations the consumers agree to have 
tested or shared, they should be given the DTC company’s contact 
information (a phone number or email), which must be maintained 
so long as the company is marketing their services, where they can 
direct questions and be told how and with whom their information 
will be stored and shared in the future. The fact that U.S. law does 
not require any sort of informed consent for DTC genetic testing 
means that the quality of the consent processes vary considerably. 
Consumers are therefore only protected through consumer 
protection statutes, which are notoriously weak at preventing 
misrepresentation.286 
 
While the specifics of what would be necessary for 
meaningful informed consent will need to be worked out in 
particular detail by others, we should at least agree that consumers 
need better information before they, perhaps naively, upload their 
genetic information online. We have mistakenly assumed that 
genetic information could be given directly to consumers, without 
the involvement of health care professionals. Unlike the measures 
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taken in Europe and elsewhere, we have also failed to require 
specific privacy and security protections for data shared online.  
 
Millions of Americans have already submitted their SNP 
profiles to public sites like GEDMatch, exposing colossal amounts of 
personal data to strangers. The review of the DTC companies’ 
consent processes reveals that many fall short of providing adequate 
information. That means that countless consumers are submitting 
their saliva or cheek cells, being tested, and then sharing their genetic 
information online, without appreciating the full risks of doing so. 
This is the true problem with FGG. The many privacy concerns 
advanced in opposition to FGG would largely subside if we made 
sure that consumers had meaningfully consented to the initial test, 
and that they had appreciated the volume of data contained in our 
genomes and how it was being shared. If consumers appreciated the 
privacy, security, and re-identification risks of genetic testing when 
they first submitted their saliva or blood sample, as well as when they 
then uploaded their data to a third-party site, we could feel more 
confident in law enforcement’s use of this data in their investigation 
of crime. But our initial suspicions about the quality of the 
consumers’ consent to DTC testing is spilling over into a misplaced 
concern about FGG. Coupled with our tendency to attribute 
intentionality to inanimate objects like DNA, to think that genetics 
plays a larger role in predicting our futures than the environment 
does, and to feel discomfort with not having control over who (or 
what) “speaks” for us, we have allowed far too much fear of genetic 
informants to take hold. Privacy advocates have misdiagnosed the 
problems with FGG and have thus proposed the wrong remedy—
banning FGG. Rather than feeding into this unwarranted fear and 
banning the methodology, we must directly address the risks at their 
roots. We can do this by shoring up consent to DTC genetic testing 
and passing legislation aimed at prohibiting certain secondary uses 
of genetic data.  
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